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The present listing shows the holders of key positions at TNI Headquarters as well 
as in the army central and regional command structure between January 1, 1999 and 
January 31, 2001.
The military underwent a deep institutional crisis in the 25 months covered by this 
listing. It continued to suffer as it did in the previous period from a loss of legitimacy 
and popular trust because of its human rights abuses and its inability to maintain law 
and order.1 Its officers were under investigation for human rights abuses in Aceh and 
East Timor, and some middle- and low-ranking officers and soldiers were court- 
martialed, though no one of high rank was actually punished.2 It lost the war in East 
Timor and its troops had to be withdrawn while multinational forces took over
1 For instance, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said on July 12,2000 that 150 police and army posts 
were attacked by local people in one month. Unfortunately, he did not say where these attacks occurred, 
though it is clear from the context that they took place all over the country. Suara Pembarmn, July 13,2000.
2 In the period under discussion, officers were under investigation for, inter alia, human rights abuses in 
Aceh and East Timor and the July 27,1996 Affair. For the kidnapping of pro-democracy activists in 1997 
and early 1998, eleven Kopassus officers and non-commissioned officers were court-martialed and 
sentenced to 12-20 months imprisonment, while their commanding officers—Lt. Gen. Prabowo, Maj. Gen. 
Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto, and Col. Chairawan—were either honorably discharged or non-activated. The 
eleven Kopassus who were sentenced kept silent about their fate, but those middle-ranking officers who 
were under investigation for the July 27,1996 Affair threatened to "sing" if they were scapegoated. See 
"Kasus 27 Juli: Tersangka Akan 'Bernyanyi' di Pengadilan," Suara Pembaruan, September 6, 2000.
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command there in September 1999. Hit by the continuing economic crisis, it could not 
support its own men. Hundreds of soldiers were arrested on various criminal charges. 
The army high command lacked the authority to control much of what was happening 
on the ground and suffered from a "dual command structure," as individual generals 
with their own sources of money funded their personal campaigns, hiring "rogue 
elements" and "deserters" and causing widespread violence, provocations, and 
killings.3 Defense Minister Mahfud noted that the government could meet only about 
30 percent of the military's minimum financial needs from the national budget, so that 
the military had to raise the remaining 70 percent via foundations and businesses 
under its control. Last but not least, internal schisms and rivalries came to the surface 
in an open, bitter intra-army war for positions of power.
As Table 3 shows, the military underwent five major reshuffles in this period: in 
January 1999, November-December 1999, March 2000, June-August 2000, and 
November-December 2000. These frequent, large-scale reshuffles, often involving more 
than 100 high-ranking officers, were manifestations of the deep institutional crisis the 
military was undergoing and of a military leadership in disarray. It is significant, 
however, that the generals finally closed ranks and that the army found a 
representative of its institutional will, at least for now, in the person of Army Chief of 
Staff Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, to protect its interests and to map out its political 
strategy. In what follows, we will first consider (a) the ethnic-regional and Academy 
backgrounds of the military elite in a time of transition and then examine (b) the 
politics of this elite and the process by which the military found its institutional will.
A. Ethnic-Regional and Academy Backgrounds
Along the ethnic-regional dimension, there is a puzzling development observable. 
Table 1 shows that the Javanese now provide only 35 percent of the central army 
elite—a significant decline from our previous listing where 55 percent (33 out of 60) 
were Javanese. Sundanese, Minangkabau, and Balinese come next, each with 9 percent, 
followed by Balinese, Toba Batak, and Madurese. In all, at least fifteen ethnic groups 
have some representation in this elite. It is not at all clear why Javanese representation 
has declined so seriously, though it is worth noting that it remains 50 percent at the
3 Before his replacement, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono identified the need for the military to wind 
up its business interests and rely on direct budgetary financing as a key to restoring military discipline. The 
Australian, September 23,2000. A "dual command structure" is taken from Derwin Pereira, "The Forces 
within the Forces," Straits Times, September 24,2000. For rogue military elements and deserters see, among 
others, "Investigasi: Cerita dari Mosaik Bom Natal," above all the story about Col. Dasiri Musnar, former 
Assisant for Intelligence to the Chief of Staff, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan (1996-97) and Commander of Korem 
011 Lhok Seumawe (1997-98) in "'Nyanian' Pengebom Medan," Tempo, February 19-25,2001, pp. 59-80; 
"Bombs, the Army and Suharto," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1,2001, pp. 24-28; and 
"Pengakuan Desertir Kopassus: Target Kelompok Cikarang Gagalkan Kongres PDI," DeTak, November 3-9,
1998. According to Juwono Sudarsono, there are more than 300 companies controlled by military 
foundations and cooperatives. But the Defense Department foundations and cooperatives, such as Yayasan 
Jenderal Soedirman and Dana Pensiun, do not have business units and need to be subsidized, Juwono said. 
See Suara Pembaruan, July 4,2000. For Mahfud's statement, see "Wawancara dengan Menhan," Suara 
Pembaruan, January 2,2001.
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regional command level (11 out of 22), even if only 26 percent at the TNI and Army 
Headquarters levels.
Table 1: Ethnic Regional Distribution of the Military Elite
Javanese 25
Sundanese 5
Minangkabau 5
Balinese 4
Toba Batak 3
Madurese 3
Ambonese 2
Buginese 2
Morotai 1
Palembangese 1
Banjarese 1
Gorontalonese 1
West Timorese 1
Mandailing Batak 1
Karo Batak 1
Unknown 6
Total 57
Table 2 shows that men from the classes of 1970 and 1971 dominate the highest 
echelons of the military structure, while the class of 1968 was eased out. It also shows 
that the classes of 1972 and 1973 made no significant headway in increasing their 
representation at TNI and Army Headquarters or in the regional commands, while the 
classes of 1974 and 1975 are now fast appearing on the horizon.
As noted earlier, Table 3 shows turmoil in the military. Elite positions changed 
hands no less than ninety-eight times in twenty-five months; in a few strategic 
instances such as Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, a single job was held by 
four different officers in our period. Since the political context in which the major 
reshuffles took place will be discussed in the next section, it is enough to note the 
following at this point: the two reshuffles in January and November 1999 were Gen. 
Wiranto's attempts to consolidate his control over the military; the reshuffle in March 
2000 took place at the brief moment of triumph of officers rebelling against him; while 
the changes in June-July and November 2000 marked the victory of conservative 
generals led by Gen. Endriartono Sutarto. It is useful to note that only 1 out of 7 jobs 
(14 percent) reverted to men from a senior class in the March 2000 reshuffle, while 11 
out of 48 (28 percent) changed hands from younger to older officers in the two 
reshuffles handled by Endriartono in the period from June 2000 to January 2001; and 
that the class of 1970 got back three jobs from younger classes, the class of 1971 four, 
the class of 1972 two, and the class of 1973 two, while the class of 1971 lost one job, 
the class of 1971 three, the class of 1973 three, and the class of 1974 four to senior 
classes over the same period. Clearly, under Endriartono, who is from the class of
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1971, the classes of 1970 and 1971 fared well at the expense of the classes of 1972 
and 1973.4
Table 2: Class Distribution of Officers in Strategic Positions as of Jan. 31,1999
Class 68
TNI HQ 
2
Army
2
TNI HQ Army
70 3 10 2 8
71 3 15 6 15
72 2 7 3 6
73 4 1 1 6
74 - 3 - 4
75 - - - 2
Unknown 3 2 4 1
Navy 2 - 3 -
Air Force 1 - 3 -
The information available to us about officers at the level of Korem commanders is 
quite incomplete, so that conclusions should be drawn with caution. Table 4 shows 
that 79 percent of Korem commanders are graduates of the Akabri classes of 1973 and 
1974. Class of 1972 officers no longer serve as Korem commanders, while, as we can 
see in Table 2 above, they are not rising to staff and command positions at Army 
Headquarters and in the regional commands, obviously because of the massive 
presence of men from the classes of 1970 and 1971 in the top positions of the military 
hierarchy. As we can see in Table 5, however, there is no indication that the turmoil we 
observe in the top elite at TNI and Army Headquarters as well as the regional 
commands has yet to spread to the Korem commander level.
4 In the two reshuffles Wiranto handled in 1999, older classes got back twelve posts out of forty-three (28 
percent). The class of 1970 got back five, the class of 1971 six, and the class of 1972 one from junior classes; 
while the class of 1971 lost two, the class of 1962 four, the class of 1963 four, and the class of 1973 two to 
senior classes. It is obvious that the classes of 1970 and 1971 benefitted at the expense of the classes of 
1972-74 under Wiranto, and it can be said that the two reshuffles handled by Endriatono reverted to the 
Wiranto policy.
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Table 3: Timing of Personnel Changes
1999 Jan.
TNI HQ
3
Army HQ 
11 (4)
Total 
14 (4)
Feb. - - -
March - - -
April - - -
May 1 - 1 (1)
June - - -
July - - -
Aug. 1 1 2
Sept. - 1 1
Oct. 1 - 1
Nov. 9 (2) 10 (2) 19(4)
Dec. 1 (1) 4 (2 ) 5 (3)
2000 Jan. 2 - 2
Feb. - - -
March 2 7(1) 9(1)
April - - -
May - - -
June 2 15(4) 17(4)
July - 9(2) 9(2)
Aug. - 3(1) 3(1)
Sept. 1 - 1
Oct. - 1 1 (2)
Dec. - 2 2
2001 Tan. - 4(2) 4 (2)
Totals 23 74 97
(In parentheses are the number of cases in which members of senior classes reclaimed jobs from their juniors.)
Table 4: Academy Class Distribution among Korem Commanders
1972 -
1973 14
1974 17
1975 6
1976 2
Total 39
(The number of Korem has declined by 2 since January 1999, because of the liquidation of Korem 174 
Ambon and Korem 164 Dili.)
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Table 5: Timing of Personnel Changes at the Korem Level
1999 Jan.
Feb. 2
March
April 1
May 6
June 4
July 1
Aug. 2
Sept. 1
Oct.
Nov.
Dec.
2000 Jan. 5
Feb. 2
March 1
April 2
May 3
June
July
Aug. 2
Sept. 5
Oct. 9
Nov. 4
Dec.
2001 Jan. 1
B. The Politics of the Military Elite
Military Politics under Wiranto (1)
As we often noted in the past, the military as an institution was not allowed to 
have its own will under President and Supreme Commander Suharto. His resignation 
on May 21, 1998, however, did not immediately lead to the emergence of a new 
military with its own will and its own political strategy. Commander-in-Chief Gen. 
Wiranto endorsed B. J. Habibie as the new President, and Habibie in turn reaffirmed 
Wiranto's position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Minister of 
Defense and Security. His position in the military was not, however, as strong as it 
often seemed to outside observers.5 Patient and calculating, Wiranto believed that he 
could wait to become President in a legitimate and constitutional way if only he could 
keep the military under his control, and the military remained the most powerful
5 Ginanjar Kartasasmita saw Wiranto as a weak man, and recommended Gen. Hendropriyono to Habibie 
for the post of Commander-in-Chief. Habibie told Hendro to wait for three months, when he would get rid of 
Wiranto. But he did not keep his promise, and Wiranto continued to consolidate his position in the military.
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institution in Indonesian politics. He was intent on leading the military as an 
instrument for his own political ambitions.
President Habibie let Wiranto run the military, apparently in the hope that the 
latter would return loyalty for trust.6 Wiranto exploited this trust to his own 
advantage. As we noted in the previous listing, he immediately removed Lt. Gen. 
Prabowo and Maj. Gen. Muchdi from strategic positions. He also shifted many of 
Prabowo's friends and allies out of key billets, but kept assigning them for important 
special missions. Thus he relied on Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razie and Maj. Gen. Kivlan Zein to 
mobilize Islamic militia forces to defend the November 1998 MPR session against 
student demonstrations. He gave Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim responsibilities for 
covert political operations in East Timor. And he turned to Maj. Gen. Sjafrie 
Sjamsuddin for handling Acehnese affairs.
Gen. Wiranto also understood well that times had changed and that the military 
had to regain legitimacy and popular trust. Relying on Chief of the Social and Political 
Staff Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, 
expert staff officer for political and security affairs, he adopted a new paradigm to 
define the military role in politics in the era of Reformasi. As noted in the previous 
listing, this new paradigm, announced on September 1, 1998, redefined the military 
role in politics in terms of power-sharing with civilian forces, neutrality in party 
politics and elections, and separation of the police from the military. This move was 
followed by the announcement on November 9,1998 that the position of Chief of the 
TNI Social and Political Staff would be abolished and replaced by that of Chief of the 
Territorial Affairs Staff; and that about 4,000 military personnel currently seconded to 
non-military government positions outside the structure of the Department of Defense 
and Security and the Armed Forces would be required to choose between returning to 
active duty or retiring. The separation of the Police from the Armed Forces took effect 
on April 1, 1999, when ABRI, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia, was 
formally renamed the TNI, or Indonesian National Military. It should be noted, 
however, that the Police, thus separated from the military, "temporarily" remained 
under Minister of Defense and Security Gen. Wiranto and were commanded by Police 
Gen. Roesmanhadi, who had previously served as Wiranto's expert staff officer for 
security and social order. It should also be noted that the dismantling of the 
Kekaryaan Staff aside, Wiranto kept the military structure largely intact.
Wiranto then began tinkering with military intelligence and the army territorial 
apparatus to ensure his future control over the military and the military's powerful 
position in national politics. He kept Kopassus, the Army Special Forces, as it was, 
though it had been substantially enlarged from 1995-98 under his rival Prabowo. He 
revived the position of Deputy Military Commander for the first time since 1983 and 
appointed Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto, previously Navy Chief of Staff, to the job. 
He reorganized BIA, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agency, with five directorates and 
its head reporting to the Assistant for Intelligence to the Chief of the General Staff, into 
BAIS TNI, the TNI Strategic Intelligence Agency, with eight directorates and its head a
6 For instance, President Habibie approved his plan without any changes at the time of the January 1999 
reshuffle and described Wiranto as the best CEO in front of all the ministers at a cabinet meeting. Straits 
Times, January 17, 1999.
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three-star general officer directly under the TNI Commander, alongside the Chiefs of 
the General and the Territorial Affairs Staffs.7 And he approved an army plan, pushed 
by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagyo and his Assistant for Operations Maj. Gen. Kiki 
Sjaynakri, to reconvert the territorial structure along pre-1984 lines, increasing the 
number of Kodam from ten to seventeen over seven years in order to accommodate 
ethnic pressures, restrain inter-ethnic competition and violence, and to compensate for 
the loss of the karyawan empire of patronage.8 In May 1999, a new Kodam 
XVI/Pattimura was established in violence-infested Maluku with an Ambonese 
engineering officer, Brig. Gen. Max Markus Tamaela, as its first commander.9
But after that things did not proceed as Gen. Wiranto hoped. In the wake of the 
general elections, he declared Aceh, East Timor, and the upcoming general session of 
the MPR as the three most important questions the military had to address. The 
security situation in Aceh, he said, had deteriorated since military operations were 
suspended in August 1998. Part of a newly-organized 3,000 man special task-force, 
the Pasukan Penindak Rusuh Massal (Mass Riot Control Force)—which consisted of 
troops seconded, among others, from the Army Strategic Reserve, the Air Force Special 
Forces (Paskhas), the Marines, and the Police Mobile Brigade—which he had sent in 
under the command of a police officer, had proved completely ineffective. Its 
operations caused more than 200,000 Acehnese to flee their homes as refugees and 
aggravated Acehnese demands for total troop withdrawal. As a result, Wiranto 
announced on August 18, 1999 that the PPRM troops would be withdrawn to their 
bases, that a new Kodam would be established in Aceh, that its staff had already been 
sent in, and that its future commander was ready. Yet the establishment of Kodam 
I/Iskandar Muda, initially scheduled to take place on September 1, 1999, was 
postponed indefinitely at the last minute because of widespread Acehnese protest and 
resistance.10
Far more seriously, East Timor turned out to be a real disaster, both for Wiranto 
and the military. The decision to hold a referendum in East Timor, whereby the East
7 See Kompas, July 18,1999; Suara Pembaruan, July 18,1999; and D&R, July 26-31,1999. It is not clear what 
responsibility each directorate has, except that Directorate "A " is in charge of domestic political affairs, 
while "D " is responsible for VIP security and has Paspampres, the Presidential Security Squad, under its 
jurisdiction.
8 As we noted in the previous issue, the plan was first announced by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Subagyo in 
March 1999. He envisioned the new territorial structure being in place by 2006. Kompas, March 22,1999. 
Also see Kompas, May 18,1999.
9 When the new Kodam XVI/Pattimura was established, Kodam VHI/Trikora was renumbered as Kodam 
XVH. On that occasion, Gen. Subagyo said that two new Korem would be established, one for North and 
one for South Maluku. But as of March 2001, no Korem has been established in either place. See Kompas, 
May 18,1999. Gen. Wiranto formally confirmed the reorganization plan to Parliament in July 1999. 
Kompas, July 3,1999. According to his explanation, Kodam I-IV would be in Sumatra, V-VIQ in Java, IX-XII 
in Kalimantan, XIII-XIV in Sulawesi, XV in Nusantenggara, XVI in Maluku and XVII in Irian. Ibid. 
Chronologically speaking, Gen. Wiranto revived the position of Deputy TNI Commander shortly after he 
formally confirmed the reorganization plan for the army territorial apparatus. In part because Admiral 
Widodo was made the Deputy TNI Commander, it was speculated then that Kowilhan, the joint 
interregional commands of the pre-1984 period, might be revived. See Kompas, July 17,1999. But, as of 
March 2001, there has been no official mention of Kowilhan.
10 Kompas, August 19,1999; Suara Pembaruan, August 18 and 21,1999; Kompas, September 1,1999.
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Timorese could choose between wide autonomy within Indonesia or independence 
from it, was made by President Habibie in January 1999. Wiranto did not oppose the 
decision, but quietly worked to make sure the East Timorese opted for autonomy. For 
this objective he relied, it seems, on two different types of officers: field officers, above 
all Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto (his Assistant for Operations), Maj. Gen. Kiki 
Syahnakri (Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff), and Maj. Gen. Adam 
Damiri (Commander of Kodam IX/Udayana) for the formal chain of command; and 
Army Special Forces officers, with Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar Makarim as his East Timor 
pro-consul, for clandestine and political operations. As the National Human Rights 
Commission concluded in its report of January 2000, the SGI (Satuan Gabungan 
Intelijen) or Joint Intelligence Force, dominated by Special Forces men, planned, 
organized, and coordinated militia activities in East Timor as instructed, and military 
and police commanders, both in East Timor and in Jakarta, were responsible for 
criminal violence, intimidation, terror, and destruction there.11 Yet the East Timorese 
overwhelmingly voted for independence on August 31,1999. Systematic destruction 
started shortly thereafter; a state of military emergency was proclaimed on September 
7 with Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri and Brig. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni (Deputy Assistant for 
Operations to the Army Chief of Staff) as commander and deputy, in the midst of 
widespread, systematic destruction carried out by the military, the police, and the 
militias. On September 13, the Indonesian government, under intense international 
pressure, was forced to accept the presence of multinational troops in East Timor. 
Finally, on September 27, the Indonesian military formally handed over authority to 
maintain security and order in East Timor to the multinational force under its 
Australian commander Gen. Cosgrove.
Massive international publicity about the savagery in East Timor put Wiranto in 
the worst possible light. It did not help that he was televised singing a sentimental song 
about East Timor while the organized violence was raging. Yet perhaps he was 
helpless, in view of his pathetic request to US Secretary of Defense William Cohen for 
24-48 additional hours to "negotiate" (as he put it) with his subordinates in East 
Timor. There followed international calls for his trial by a UN tribunal. These 
circumstances objectively finished any possibility of his becoming vice-president. 
Furthermore, the outcome of the referendum made it clear that he had been 
hoodwinked by Xanana Gusmao. The leaders of Falintil (the armed wing of the East 
Timorese resistance movement) had originally planned a total boycott of the 
Indonesian national elections of June 1999. But Xanana realized that this would play 
straight into the hands of Zacky Anwar Makarim, who was looking for a pretext to 
prevent the referendum being held; accordingly, he countermanded Falintil's plan and 
ordered instead a strong turnout to lull the military to sleep. East Timorese then 
produced die second highest turnout for Golkar after Habibie's home province of South 
Sulawesi. No doubt Wiranto and Zacky Anwar took Golkar's strong showing as 
evidence that the referendum could be successfully "managed." Beyond that, local 
officials and military officers were so in the habit of sending good news up the chain of 
command that even when they were privately suspicious or pessimistic they continued 
to report that everything was going well. This got the military leadership under Gen. 
Wiranto what it deserved: a total and humiliating defeat in East Timor. This was
11 Suara Pembarmn, December 17,1999.
144 The Editors
certainly the single most important political development in the period under review, 
and one likely to have serious long-term consequences for the military and its political 
role.
The presidential and vice-presidential elections also did not go as Gen. Wiranto 
hoped. He had long anticipated that he would be chosen as Vice-President. He 
announced as early as July 1999 that the military and police faction in the MPR would 
not abstain in the elections, and he silenced Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and 
Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, both of whom argued for military neutrality. He 
established a team for his vice-presidential campaign at TNI headquarters and 
appointed Chief of BAIS Lt. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto to chair the team. But in the end, he 
was forced to give up his ambitions when the military and police faction in the MPR 
voted for Megawati as Vice-President.
The Military under Wiranto (2)
Yet Wiranto survived for a while despite these setbacks. He was one of the four 
leaders newly-elected President Abdurrahman Wahid consulted with in forming his 
cabinet, together with Vice-President Megawati, MPR chairman Amien Rais, and DPR 
chairman Akbar Tandjung. Juwono Sudarsono, a civilian and former Minister of 
Education, and Admiral Widodo, Deputy TNI Commander, were appointed Minister 
of Defense and TNI Commander at his recommendation, not only for a better 
international image of the military but also and more importantly because Wiranto felt 
he could continue to keep his influence in the military if it was placed under the weak 
leadership of a civilian defense minister and a navy TNI Commander. Lt. Gen. Agum 
Gumelar, Governor of the National Defense Institute, and Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, Wiranto's Chief of the Territorial Affairs Staff, were appointed ministers 
of transportation and of mining and energy respectively, also at Wiranto's 
recommendation—and were thus safely removed from the list of candidates for TNI 
Commander and Army Chief of Staff. On November 4,1999, the day he handed over 
command of the TNI to Admiral Widodo, another major reshuffle was announced. Lt. 
Gen. Fachrul Razie was made Deputy TNI Commander; Lt. Gen. Agus Widjaja and 
Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy were appointed Chief of the Territorial Affairs and 
General Staffs; Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago was made Deputy Army Chief of Staff; and 
Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman was promoted to Commander of the Army Strategic 
Reserve. Eight out of eleven army regional commanders were also replaced. No doubt 
Wiranto expected that he would be fully in charge of political and security affairs in 
the new cabinet. Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono had this to say, as reported by 
The International Herald Tribune in early December:
His [Wiranto's] new job, coordinating minister for political affairs and security, 
had previously been mainly a figurehead position with no real power. But the 
general has turned the job into something making him virtually a powerful chief of 
staff to the nearly blind Mr. Wahid. In cabinet meetings, General Wiranto sits just 
to Mr. Wahid's right, chairing the sessions and deciding the agendas, Mr. Juwono 
said. He lays out the policy options. "Wiranto on occasion becomes effectively the
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president and the vice-president at the same time/' Mr. Juwono said. "It's a 
powerful role."12
But Juwono turned out to be wrong. In fact, as soon as he was elected, the 
President started to undermine Gen. Wiranto's position. Bondan Gunawan, an old 
friend of the President from the days of the Democratic Forum, was instrumental in 
establishing contacts with Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, whom Wiranto had 
alienated by his vice-presidential campaign and by the decision to exile him to 
Makasar as Commander of Kodam VH/Wirabuana; and Bondan also made contact 
with Lt. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, with whom Bondan had worked to make Megawati 
Vice-President. Tyasno was rewarded in mid-November with an appointment as 
Army Chief of Staff. In early January 2000, the President also replaced Police Gen. 
Roesmanhadi with Police Lt. Gen. Rusdihardjo as Chief of Police and appointed Air 
Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma Chief of BAIS TNI, succeeding Tyasno. And 
when military spokesman and Wiranto loyalist Maj. Gen. Sudradjat said that the 
President, as the supreme military commander, should not intervene in the 
appointment and placement of officers, thereby undermining military professionalism, 
he was summarily dismissed by the President and replaced with another air force 
officer, Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo.13
Nor did the President follow Wiranto's advice on Aceh. On October 31, he decided 
not to establish a Kodam in Aceh but rather to withdraw Kostrad and Kopassus 
troops. He also instructed the TNI Commander, Admiral Widodo, to investigate past 
human rights abuses in Aceh, including the massacre in which Tengku Bantaqiah and 
55 other people were cold-bloodedly killed at the orders of Lt. Col. Sujono, chief of the 
Korem Oil intelligence team.14 And in deciding the government position on the 
Acehnese demand for a referendum in early December, the President overrode military 
and police suggestions for the proclamation of a military emergency in favor of 
dialogue and negotiations with the Acehnese.15
12 Keith Richburg, "Indonesia's Military: Still in Power," International Herald Tribune, December 4-5,
1999.
13 The President, for instance, summoned TNI Commander Admiral Widodo early in January 2000 and told 
him to change the commander of Kodam XVI/Pattimura. See Suara Pembaruan, January 10,2000. It is not 
presidential intervention in the appointment and placement of generals that upsets the military, sources say, 
but his meddling in the placement of colonels and lieutenant-colonels. Sudradjat repented and was 
eventually rehabilitated as Director-General of Defense Strategy, Department of Defense, in January 2001.
14 Suara Pembaruan, November.l and 2,1999. Admiral Widodo stated that he had sent a team headed by 
Brig. Gen. Zul Fahmi, Deputy Assistant for Intelligence to the Chief of the General Staff, for the preliminary 
investigation; no Kodam would be established in Aceh and all the staff who had been sent there to make 
preparations had already been withdrawn. Suara Pembaruan, November 9 and 10,1999. For the Tengku 
Bantaqiah massacre, see, among other sources, Suara Pembaruan, April 22,2000.
15 Military spokesman Maj. Gen. Sudradjat stated on November 12,1999 that the military would take 
coercive measures if Acehnese independence were proclaimed. Police Chief Gen. Roesmanhadi called for a 
state of military emergency in Aceh on November 17. This proposal was supported by Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. Subagyo on November 18. (Note that all these announcements were most likely made with Wiranto's 
approval.) But Admiral Widodo supported the President and announced on the same day that the time had 
not yet come for a state of military emergency. See Suara Pembaruan, November 12,18, and 19,1999.
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Abdurrahman Wahid also undermined Wiranto's plan for the reorganization of the 
army's territorial apparatus. On the eve of the Presidential election, Maj. Gen. Agus 
Wirahadikusumah had launched a book, Indonesia Baru and Tantangan TNI: Pikiran 
Masa Depan (A New Indonesia and Challenge for the TNI: Thoughts for the Future) 
which he and his 1973 academy classmates wrote with the assistance of Bondan 
Gunawan. This book denounced the military's role under Suharto and called on the 
incoming president to remove the military from politics altogether. This move enraged 
Wiranto, who subsequently banished Agus to Makasar. He was installed as 
commander of Kodam VH/Wirabuana on December 8. Less than a week later, Agus hit 
back, in careful coordination with Bondan Gunawan. On December 13, he testified 
before a parliamentary committee, calling for the dismantling of the army territorial 
apparatus, starting with Korem, Koramil, and Babinsa, in view of the failure of the 
territorial system and the need to expand real local autonomy in the era of Reformasi. 
The military, he argued, should focus on defense (pertahanan), defined clearly and 
made separate from security (keam anan ), and should not take over police 
responsibilities in the name of territorial management. He also stated that he did not 
agree with the planned reorganization of the army regional command structure.16 Over 
the following week, his interviews were published in every major newsweekly and not 
a few newspapers and tabloids, where he criticized the military for corruption, abuse 
of power, incompetence, and feudal thinking. This represented the most brazen 
challenge to the military leadership in a long time. It also focused public attention on 
the army territorial apparatus as the central question of military reform. Though Maj. 
Gen. Sudradjat, the military spokesman, angrily dismissed Agus's action as violating 
the officers' code of ethics, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono said: "I think we are 
moving in the same direction, though we perhaps disagree about its scale and 
speed."17
This "campaign" marked the emergence of Agus Wirahadikusumah on center stage 
as a leading reformist in the eyes of the public, but in the eyes of many officers as a 
self-promoting opportunist and willing tool of presidential interventionism. He met 
with the President for the first time on December 16,1999 and announced that soldiers 
were dedicated to the military as an institution, to the nation and the state, and not to 
generals or high-ranking military officers. He also said on the occasion that he did not 
think soldiers would be offended if the National Human Rights Commission 
summoned high-ranking officers for investigation into human rights abuses and openly 
contradicted Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman, who had warned against any such thing.18
The President also rode on high public expectations of government investigations 
into past human rights abuses to take the offensive against the military. As we have 
seen, within weeks of his election, he instructed the TNI Commander to investigate
16 Suara Pembaruan, December 13 and 14,1999.
17 Suara Pembaruan, December 12 and 14,1999; and TNI Watch! December 21,1999. Newspapers also 
reported on popular resistance to the establishment of a Korem in Pulau Bunga, Flores, as the replacement of 
the now liquidated Korem 164 Dili. Col. Encip Kadarusman, Commander of Korem 121 Pontianak, on the 
other hand, reaffirmed the reorganization plan and stated that a new Kodam would be established in West 
Kalimantan in 2003 . See Suara Pembaruan, December 14 and 15,1999.
18 See Suara Pembaruan, December 16 and 17,1999. Wiranto was being investigated for crimes in East 
Timor at the time.
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human rights abuses in Aceh. On November 29, 1999, the parliamentary special 
committee on Aceh summoned to parliament those officers who had dominated the 
military in the late New Order era and who were most responsible for atrocities in the 
early years of military operations in Aceh: Gen. L. B. Moerdani (Armed Forces 
Commander-m-Chief, 1983-88; Minister of Defense and Security, 1988-1993), Gen. Try 
Sutrisno (Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, 1988-1993), Gen. Feisal Tanjung 
(Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, 1993-1998), Lt. Gen. Syarwan Hamid 
(Commander of Korem Oil Lhok Seumawe, 1991-92), Maj. Gen. Pramono 
(Commander of Kodam I/Bukit Barisan, 1990-93) and Maj. Gen. Zacky Anwar 
Makarim (Commander of the Kopassus Task Force in Aceh, 1989-90 and Chief of BIA, 
1997-99) as well as Prof. Ibrahim Hasan, Governor of Aceh. The Chief of Police also 
reopened the investigation into the July 27,1996 Affair.19 The National Human Rights 
Commission concluded in the report it submitted to the President on January 31, 2000 
that military operations in East Timor were led by the military and the police and 
recommended that the Attorney-General's office investigate Wiranto's responsibility 
and that the army territorial apparatus be dismantled.20
The President seized on this report on East Timor. While travelling in Europe, he 
publicly announced that he would ask Wiranto to resign as Coordinating Minister for 
Political and Security Affairs once he was back home.21 This announcement started a 
protracted tussle between the President and his Coordinating Minister, during which a 
coup was rumored (though it was hardly likely in reality) and which came to be seen 
as a major test of civilian control over the military and of military officers' loyalty to 
the civilian President. Eventually, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno convened a 
commanders' meeting in Bandung on February 10 and made the announcement after 
the meeting that Gen. Wiranto had better obey the President's wishes and resign. On 
the same day, Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, Commander of Kodam Jaya, also 
announced that he would never stage a coup himself nor would he allow anyone else to 
do so.22 Gen. Wiranto was suspended as Coordinating Minister on February 14, 2000, 
the day the President returned home, and formally resigned from the position three 
months later on May 16.
Post-Wiranto Developments: Army Infighting
Thus came to an end Gen. Wiranto's military and political career. His resignation 
also marked the beginning of an open, bitter intra-army war for positions of power and 
authority. Central to this infighting were the "BTA," as the Bulakrantai document—an 
anonymous propaganda broadside which caused a sensation in June 2000—later had 
it: that is, Bondan Gunawan, who was formally installed as State Secretary in early 
February, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno Sudarto, whom sources invariably
19 Suara Pembaruan, November 29 and December 14,1999.
20 Suara Pembaruan, December 17,1999 and January 31, 2000.
21 Suara Pembaruan, January 31, 2000.
22 Suara Pembaruan, February 11, 2000.
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describe as a consummate opportunist; and Bondan's military ally Maj. Gen. Agus 
Wirahadikusumah.23
When he was suspended as Coordinating Minister on February 14, Gen. Wiranto 
vented his anger at Agus, saying: "It is the TNI Commander and the Army Chief of 
Staff who should speak on national questions, but this two-star fellow talks openly as 
if he were four-star. This is not the kind of behavior that reflects the officers' code of 
ethics, which must be protected, developed, and firmly maintained." He demanded 
that the military leadership discipline Agus. TNI Commander Admiral Widodo then 
instructed the Army Chief of Staff to take disciplinary measures. Gen. Tyasno duly 
summoned Agus to Jakarta. But as army spokesman Brig. Gen. I Dewa Putu Rai openly 
admitted, Agus was not reprimanded on the occasion but was simply asked to clarify 
himself.24
The discussion of another major reshuffle started while this Agus-Wiranto quarrel 
was going on. Lt. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy, Chief of the General Staff and one of 
Wiranto's closest allies, said that the military would undergo another major shakeup 
soon, but that Agus Wirahadikusumah was not included in the list of officers slated 
for reassignment. The President then intervened. As he admitted himself, he "entrusted 
(titip) Agus Wirahadikusumah to the [military] leadership" with the message that 
"this Agus should not be wasted [in Makasar]; place him in Jakarta, because he is a 
good thinker."25 In the reshuffle announced on February 29, 2000, some of Wiranto's 
more prominent proteges were dismissed after their brief four-month tours of duty: Lt. 
Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy was replaced by Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, and 
Commander of Army Strategic Reserve Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman was sent off to 
Bandung as Commander of the Staff and Command School. In their place came Agus 
Wirahadikusumah and his classmate allies. Agus succeeded Djaja Suparman as 
Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, Brig. Gen. Saurip Kadi was promoted to 
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff, and Col. Romulo Robert 
Simbolon was made Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya. But by the time the reshuffle was 
announced, Gen. Tyasno was already starting to distance himself from Agus and his 
friends because he correctly sensed that their promotions would anger senior generals. 
He tried to promote Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto, Assistant for Operations at the time 
of the East Timor crisis, whom Wiranto had rewarded with a promotion and 
appointment as Commander of the Staff and Command School in the November 1999 
reshuffle, to Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve. This maneuver, however, did 
not work because of the President's intervention, but it did lead to the appointment of 
Endriartono as Deputy Army Chief of Staff 26
23 Sources often say that Tyasno was close to the Suhartos since he served as Director of BIA Directorate 
"D " in the mid-1990s; that he headed the team to get Wiranto elected vice-president but dumped him at the 
last minute in favor of Megawati; that he distanced himself from Agus Wirahadikusumah as soon as he 
sensed the widespread anger among the generals against Agus; and that he dissociated himself from the 
President and approached Megawati toward the end of his career as Army Chief of Staff.
24 Wiranto's statement is quoted from Suara Pembaruan, February 15,2000. See Jakarta Post, February 19, 
2000.
25 The quotation is from Suara Pembaruan, March 2,2000.
25 See Suara Pembaruan, February 28, 2000; Gamma, February 29,2000; Radio Nederland, February 25, 
2000.
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With Gen. Wiranto now out of the way, the President took initiatives in military 
and security policy. On March 2, 2000, he announced an expansion of the police from 
its current strength of 200,000 to 600,000 personnel.27 On March 9, he decided to 
disband Bakorstanas, the Coordinating Body for National Stability, without previous 
consultation with the TNI Commander. About five hundred officers and civilians, 
including three generals and 87 colonels, lost their jobs, and Admiral Widodo frankly 
admitted that their replacement in the military was a problem.28
Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono also seized on this opportunity. Stressing the 
concept of defense management based on civilian authority, he announced to 
parliament that the political function of the military should be reduced step by step so 
that by 2010 only the Minister of Defense would speak on political questions; that it 
was possible to dismantle the territorial apparatus from the regional command level 
down to that of the Babinsa; that the police would be transferred from the Department 
of Defense to the jurisdiction of the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security 
Affairs on January 2001 and then come directly under the President on July 1, 2001; 
that the numbers of the police would be increased from the current 200,000 to 300,000 
over five years; that the Department of Defense would be geared to anticipating 
threats from abroad for the coming five to ten years, while the question of internal 
defense (pertahanan dalam negeri) would be fully handled by the military and the 
police; that by 2010 the Minister of Defense would have the TNI Commander and the 
three service chiefs under him, so that the TNI Commander would be appointed not by 
the President but by the Defense Minister. He also announced on a different occasion 
that the military was rearranging (menata kembali) its troops and that the number of 
Army Special Forces personnel would be shrunk from 6,000 to 5,300 over the coming 
eighteen months.29
Under pressure, the army leadership decided on May 16 to withdraw the Babinsa, 
step by step. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno Sudarto announced after the army 
leadership meeting (Rapim AD) that non-commissioned officers stationed all over 
Indonesia would start to be withdrawn, initially from the largest urban centers such as 
Jakarta and Surabaya and subsequently from other cities. But apparently he met
27 Suara Pembaruan, March 2,2000. On this occasion, the police chief also announced a police 
reorganization whereby the regional police (polda) of North Sumatra, South Sumatra, and South Sulawesi 
would be reclassified as type A along with the four regional police in Java, while the other twenty regional 
police would remain classified as type B; that three regional police would be added if new provinces were 
created in Irian Jaya and Maluku; and that 250 new resort police (polres) would be created to make a total 
of 325.
It should be noted that the navy also benefited from Presidential patronage and from the appointment of 
a navy officer as the TNI Commander. In December 1999, when Gen. Harry Triono replaced Gen. Suharto as 
commander of the marines, the Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Achmad Sutjipto said that the marines would be 
beefed up from the current two brigades with a force strength of 13,000 to three brigades with a force 
strength of 23,000 personnel. Suara Pembaruan, December 8,1999. Sutjipto also announced on February 9, 
2000 that five new maritime regional commands (Komando Daerah Maritim, or Kodamar) would be 
established and that, over five years, the fleet would be expanded from 114 to 120 ships.
28 See Admiral Widodo's statement quoted in Suara Pembaruan, April 10,2000. Bakorstanas was formally 
liquidated on April 10, 2000.
29 Suara Pembaruan, March 8 and 21,2000. See also his interview with Suara Pembaruan, July 4,2000.
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resistance at the meeting, for he made it clear that the decision did not mean that the 
army had decided to abolish its territorial function.30
By then, however, the "BTA" were no longer in alliance and each member was in 
trouble in a different way. The main cause was straightforward: the fact that Maj. Gen. 
Agus Wirahadikusumah and his allies were rewarded with promotions for their 
rebellion caused widespread resentment and anger among senior generals. The initial 
attack came surreptitiously. In early March—that is, less than a week after the 
reshuffle—a few people were arrested in Bogor and Jakarta for making counterfeit 
50,000 rupiah bills. Shortly after that, newsweeklies and tabloids started to report 
that Gen. Tyasno Sudarto was centrally involved in the case when he was the Chief of 
BAIS and that the money was used to pay the East Timor militias. There are good 
reasons to believe that the reports were close to the mark. After all, it was Tyasno's 
job then to pay for covert operations and, indeed, for the militias in East Timor. The 
stories say that he asked TNI Headquarters for money and was turned down because 
of general financial difficulties. This refusal led him to forgery, done in collusion with 
the Governor of the Bank of Indonesia, Syahril Sabirin, who sold him genuine serial 
numbers with a fee for each one.31 In late May, Bondan Gunawan was forced to resign 
from his positions as State Secretary and Secretary for Development Supervision 
because of his alleged involvement in the Bulog scandal and reportedly because of 
Vice-President Megawati's displeasure with his maneuvers at the PDI-P congress.
The fall of Bondan Gunawan sent a signal to the army leadership that Agus and 
his friends had lost their most important ally in the presidential palace, and therefore 
it could go ahead with another reshuffle in order to oust them. Lt. Gen. Endriartono 
Sutarto, Deputy Army Chief of Staff, chaired the committee to make recommendations 
to the formal Council on High Ranks and Positions (Dewan Kepangkatan dan Jabatan 
Tinggi, or Wanjakti). Clearly, he was the driving force behind the reshuffle, though he 
had strong support from men like Wiranto and Djaja Suparman, whom Agus had 
pushed out of their positions of power. Endriartono said there was no intervention 
from outside and that his committee's recommendations were not very different from 
the final decisions made at Wanjakti. In the reshuffle, which was formally announced 
on June 16, Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi was ousted from the position of Assistant for 
Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff, after serving for only four months, and 
was replaced by Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma.32
Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah fought right back. Soon after the reshuffle, he 
ordered an audit of the Yayasan Kostrad Darma Putra, an Army Strategic Reserve 
foundation, discovered irregularities which might involve Gen. Wiranto and Lt. Gen. 
Djaja Suparman, and suspended two colonels, the Kostrad Head of Finance, and the 
Assistant for Logistics. This, however, led to his own downfall. On July 31, it was 
announced that he would be replaced by Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu as 
Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, while his ally Brig. Gen. Romulo Robert
30 See Tyasno's statement reported in Suara Pembaruan, May 17,2000.
31 See, for instance, Suara Pembaruan, March 9,2000. It turned out, however, that not only the militias, but 
even Indonesian soldiers stationed in East Timor, were paid with counterfeit money.
32 Suara Pembaruan, July 12, 2000 and Gatra, June 24, 2000.
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Simbolon was ousted as Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya, and replaced by Brig. Gen. 
Lintang Waluyo.
The Rise o f Endriartono Sutarto
This was not the end of the intra-army fighting, however. Deeply unhappy with 
police investigations of a series of bombing incidents (which seemed to be going 
nowhere), suspicious of military involvement in these cases, and eager to fight what he 
regarded as attempts to destabilize his government, the President went on the 
offensive after the Atambua incident in early September to neutralize the generals, 
especially those whom he suspected were closely linked with Gen. Wiranto.33 As he 
stated in an interview with Asiaweek in early October, the President understood his 
biggest challenge to be establishing the full authority of his government over rogue 
elements of the military and police and staring down the supporters of Suharto, whom 
he blamed for mounting violence and terror.34 But evidently he did not understand how 
to handle an organization and thus tried to intervene in the promotion and placement 
of individual officers.
On September 18, 2000, he abruptly dismissed Chief of Police Gen. Rusdihardjo 
and appointed Gen. Suroyo Bimantoro as care-taker.35 The next day, he abolished the 
position of Deputy TNI Commander and dismissed Gen. Fachrul Razie. Rumors had it 
that the President was even planning to replace the TNI Commander, that he had 
abolished the post of Deputy TNI Commander to pave the way for Air Force Chief of 
Staff Marshal Hanafie Asnan to be Admiral Widodo's replacement, and that he was 
thinking of replacing Gen. Tyasno Sudamo with Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah as 
Army Chief of Staff.
The army generals were, however, dead-set against presidential intervention this 
time. Two developments favored their resistance. First, the MPR had made the 
decision at its annual session in August 2000 to require the President to obtain 
parliamentary approval for the appointment and dismissal of the TNI Commander 
and the Chief of Police. The President had ignored this decision in dismissing Gen. 
Rusdihardjo as Chief of Police. Parliament was therefore in no mood to approve any 
presidential decision to replace the TNI Commander.36
Second and more importantly, Vice-President Megawati had become an ally of the 
army, as demonstrated by PDI-P support at the MPR's August 2000 session for the
33 Bombing incidents took place, inter alia, at a church in Medan on June 1,2000; at the Attorney-General's 
office in Jakarta on July 4; in a ferry at the port of Surabaya on July 24; at the Philippine Embassy on 
August 1; and at the Jakarta Stock Exchange on September 13. The Atambua incident, in which three UN 
workers were murdered by East Timorese militia members, took place on September 6, just as Abdurrahman 
Wahid was attending the UN Millenium Summit in New York.
34 Asiaweek, October 6, 2000. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs also said that 
the bombings were suspected to be connected to a single political network, but he did not name names. 
Channel News Asia (Singapore), October 6, 2000.
35 Gen. Suroyo Bimantoro was formally installed on September 24,2000 as the new Chief of Police.
36 Snara Pembaruan, September 18,2000. See also Straits Times, September 21,2000; and Adil, October 9,
2000.
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retention of military representation in Parliament beyond 2004, and by her own visit, 
dressed in army fatigues, to the Headquarters of the Army Special Forces and the 
Army Strategic Reserve in September 2000. (It was obvious that her eyes were on the 
presidency and she needed military support.) Sources say that retired generals Theo 
Syafei (with former Chief of the Social and Political Staff Gen. Harsudiono Hartas, 
former Chief of BIA Maj. Gen. Sjamsiar Siregar, former Deputy Army Chief of Staff 
Gen. Suryadi, and others behind him) and Hendropriyono (who introduced 
Endriartono Sutarto to Megawati) were (and still are) instrumental in Megawati's 
communication with senior generals. Sources also say that she shared (and still shares) 
the view of senior generals on the importance of the military in maintaining national 
unity and the need to deal decisively with threats to Indonesia's territorial integrity in 
Aceh and Irian Jaya/West Papua.37 Army generals thus could and did rely on the 
Vice-President to stave off presidential intervention in the military and to protect 
military interests.
It was against this backdrop that Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno Sudarto 
maneuvered to prevent the President from imposing Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah 
as Army Chief of Staff and to consolidate army support for his own bid for command 
of the TNI. He convened three commanders' meetings in early October, at the Army 
Special Forces Headquarters in Cijantung, at the Candidate Officers' School (Secapa) 
in Bandung, and at the Korem 074 Headquarters in Solo. The commanders' meetings, 
which were attended by many generals—above all, the regional military commanders, 
the Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve, as well as the Commander-General of 
Army Special Forces—became an important institutional mechanism to achieve 
consensus and to determine the organizational will of the army. The commanders' 
meeting in Bandung led to the signing of a document by 45 generals which stated that 
Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah should not be appointed Army Chief of Staff and 
that Agus and Saurip Kadi should be brought before the Officers' Honor Board. 
Presumably, the consensus had also emerged by then that Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto 
should be the next Army Chief of Staff. Endriartono, representing the generals, 
conveyed the decision to the Vice-President and announced that he would resign from 
the army if Agus Wirahadikusumah were made Army Chief of Staff.
The President let Coordinating Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono talk with 
Endriartono to seek a compromise. His offer was to appoint Endriartono Army Chief 
of Staff and Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah as his deputy. But Endriartono refused 
the deal, said he would resign if Agus were made Deputy Army Chief of Staff, 
contacted the Vice-President, and obtained her support. On October 6, the President 
gave in. Endriartono was appointed Army Chief of Staff the next day (and formally 
installed in the position on October 18).38
37 See also Derwin Pereira, "TNI takes Mega's hand as Gus Dur loses its trust," Straits Times, November 
24, 2000.
38 Suara Pembaruan, October 8,2000. On the day that Endriartono's appointment as Army Chief of Staff 
was announced, army spokesman Brig. Gen. F.X. Bachtiar confirmed that, at the Bandung meeting, the 
commanders asked Army Chief of Staff Gen. Tyasno to take measures against Agus Wirahadikusumah and 
Saurip Kadi, who were seen to have transgressed the army code of ethics. But a week after his appointment, 
the Vice-President reportedly summoned Endriartono to express her disappointment at his threat of 
bringing Agus before the Honor Board. Endriartono backed down after she warned him that this would
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Endriartono has thus emerged as the new army leader and the representative of its 
organizational will to block presidential intervention in internal military affairs, to 
protect the army from external attack, and to keep differences tightly inside the army. 
As his career shows (Assistant for Operations to the Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya, 
1993-94; Commander, Korem 173 Biak, 1994-95; Chief of Staff, First Infantry 
Division, Army Strategic Reserve, 1995-96; Deputy Assistant for General Planning to 
the Commander-in-Chief, 1996; Deputy Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of 
Staff, 1996-96; Commander, Presidential Security Guard, 1997-98; Assistant for 
Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, 1998-99; Commander, Staff and Command 
School, 1999-2000; and Deputy Army Chief of Staff, 2000), Endriartono represents 
the tough, conservative field generals together with Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago, Lt. 
Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, and Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri—the kind of officers Wiranto relied 
on in handling East Timor.
Endriartono flexed his muscles as soon as he was installed as Army Chief of Staff 
in the appointment of a new Deputy Army Chief of Staff. Though it was widely 
speculated that Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu was the likely candidate for the position, 
Endriartono destroyed his chances by stating publicly in late October that he did not 
want officers to sit in their positions for only a month or two, since this made it look 
as if the army was in a state of constant emergency.39 At the same time, he studiously 
followed the formal Wanjakti procedure to come up with the candidate he had had in 
mind from the start. Gen. Kiki Syahnakiri, his classmate and his counterpart at Army 
Headquarters when he was responsible for military operations in East Timor in 1999, 
was thus duly appointed his deputy on November 6.40
Under his leadership, the army also started to assert itself on policy issues. On 
November 24, he announced that the army was ready to send in troops to Aceh and 
Irian Jaya, provided the President made the decision.41 Perhaps resolutions had to be 
sought in Aceh and Irian Jaya without resorting to military operations as far as 
possible, he said on another occasion, but if the Republic were threatened with the 
separation of Aceh and Irian Jaya, there had to be a political decision to prevent 
national disintegration.42
He also reaffirmed the reduction of Army Special Forces from 7,000 to 5,000 men 
and announced its reorganization in mid-January 2001.43 In the future, he commented, 
the Army Special Forces would consist of three Groups: two commando groups and
only divide the army further. Shortly thereafter, at Megawati's request, twenty generals gathered for an 
informal meeting in her residence, where she sought assurances that there would be no more jostling for 
power among them. See also Straits Times, November 24,2000.
39 Suara Pembaruati, October 27,2000.
He also demonstrated his power in January 2001, when he announced the replacement of Kodam Jaya 
Commander Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro by Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo. He made this decision with only pro 
forma approval from the TNI Commander, sources say.
41 Suara Pembaruati, November 24,2000.
42 Suara Pembaruati, December 16,2000. But the President did not agree and said he would pursue dialogue 
with the Acehnese. Suara Pembaruati, December 20,2000.
43 Juwono Sudarsono earlier said that Kopassus would be reduced from 6,000 to 5,300 men. It is not clear 
which numbers, Juwono's or Endriartono's, are closer to the mark.
154 The Editors
one intelligence group, plus a counter-terrorism unit, while Group 3—whose function 
was education and training—would no longer be called a Group but would revert to its 
former status as an educational center.44
Finally, on the eve of the January 3, 2001 parliamentary vote on censuring the 
President, Endriartono stood up against the Head of State 45 The President wanted to 
proclaim a state of emergency and dissolve Parliament to thwart the vote. He raised 
this issue on January 28 for the first time. He raised it again when he gathered the TNI 
Commander and the three service chiefs along with Vice-President Megawati, 
Coordinating Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Defense Minister Mahfud for 
breakfast on January 31. On this occasion, he insisted on proclaiming the state of 
emergency and dissolving Parliament. No one supported the President, and Gen. 
Endriartono advised against his plan. In an interview with The Jakarta Post, 
Endriartono stated: "No, he has never asked about it [the emergency]. But, we did 
suggest to Gus Dur that introducing a state of emergency would only lead to grave 
consequences for the state and therefore we expected Gus Dur not to impose the 
status."46
On the same day, January 31,2001, the military and police members of Parliament 
voted for acceptance of the special committee investigation report which censured the 
President for his alleged involvement in the scandals. This was an institutional 
decision by the military. Though Endriartono said the military would protect 
Abdurrahman Wahid in his capacity as Head of State, there was no question any more 
about the fact that the relationship between the military and the President had become 
very precarious. Though the army is against any fast-track impeachment, it would not 
oppose an effort to remove Wahid through regular constitutional processes.
Thus the army has come to have its own will and its own political strategy—close 
ranks, ally with Megawati, keep national unity as the banner of legitimacy, and protect 
the military even at the expense of an incumbent President. Its inclination is deeply 
conservative: eager to remain as it was under Suharto and to maintain interests it has 
enjoyed for so many years. But it is now aware of its need for social and political 
legitimacy. This explains the army's insistence on the need for "legal cover" for any 
military operation. It wants the civilian government to take responsibility for any 
future atrocities committed by military personnel.
Needless to say, it is too early to say anything definite about the staying power of 
Gen. Endriartono Sutarto as a military leader or the longevity of current army unity. As 
noted earlier, the military is now dominated by army officers of the classes of 1970 
and 1971, while officers from the classes of 1974 and 1975 are fast appearing on the
44 Radio Nederland, January 18, 2001.
4  ^Parliament voted to censure the President for his involvement in the Bulog and the Sultan of Brunei 
donation scandals. It should be noted, however, that while the "reformists" were (and still are) screaming 
about these presidential scandals, the vastly corrupt Suharto circle remains largely unscathed. Suharto's 
daughter Tutut still collects large sums from the capital's toll-roads. Sudwikatmono still controls the 
country's movie-houses. And Amien Rais's chief financier is none other than Fuad Bawazier, a notorious 
crony of the fallen President.
46 The Jakarta Post, February 3, 2001. See also an informative article in the Straits Times, February 5, 2001 
as well as The Far Eastern Economic Review, February 22, 2001.
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horizon, with Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu and Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni as their 
stars. Endriartono played class politics to consolidate his position as Army Chief of 
Staff, favoring the classes of 1970 and 1971 at the expense of the classes of 1972-73. 
This is bound to be resented. Army unity will be seriously tested if the government, 
whether under Abdurrahman Wahid or his successor, tries to exploit this "class 
contradiction" in the leadership transition from the classes of 1970-71 to the classes of 
1974-75. (With Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman and Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah now 
marginalized and Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono out of active service, officers from 
the classes of 1972 and 1973 are likely to be sidelined by the classes below them.) It is 
also useful to remind ourselves that this is not the first time the army has reached a 
consensus to ward off civilian intervention. In the mid-1950s, concern over civilian 
intervention in internal army conflicts led to the production of the Yogya Charter 
Consensus; yet, only a few years later, the PRRI-Permesta rebellion broke out, with 
Charter signers fighting on both sides. Today the army is a far more rotten institution 
than it was then, and is in far deeper crisis. No single "good general" can fix it up in a 
few months. As former Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono sensibly said, no one can 
really control the army until there is centralized financial control, and, we might add, 
until a general or two is put on trial for running rogue military elements for private 
political and economic "missions."
Finally, it should be noted that three important developments are now under way 
which may reshape the military institution in many significant respects. In the first 
place, a new defense bill is now under discussion in Parliament, whereby the military is 
defined as responsible for defense while the police is made responsible for security and 
social order.
In the second place, the Department of Defense was reorganized in December 
2000. The Department now consists of five directorate-generals in contrast with the 
previous three: Directorate-Generals for Defense Strategy (Strategi Pertahanan, or 
Stratan), Defense System Planning (Perencanaan Sistem Pertahanan, or Rensistan), 
Defense Potentialities (Potensi Pertahanan, or Pothan), Defense Strength (Kekuatan 
Pertahanan, or Kuathan), and Defense Facilities and Industries (Industri Sarana 
Pertahanan, or Indranahan). Gen. Johny Lumintang was appointed Secretary-General 
of Defense, while Maj. Gen. Sudradjat was rehabilitated, after a year in the wilderness, 
as Director-General for Strategic Defense. With this reorganization, the Department of 
Defense has obtained its own intelligence agency for the first time (in the Directorate- 
General for Strategic Defense). Sources say this body is to be responsible for strategic 
intelligence, while BAIS TNI will handle only operational intelligence. As of the end of 
March 2001, however, no reorganization of military intelligence has been reported.
Lastly, we may note that, with the separation of the police from the military, the 
State Intelligence Coordinating Agency, Bakin, was reorganized in January 2001. It is 
no longer called Bakin, but BIN, Badan Intelijen Negara or State Intelligence Agency, 
with police intelligence as its operational arm. It is still headed by Lt. Gen. Arie 
Kumaat, but his deputy, Maj. Gen. Farid Zaenuddin, has been replaced by Ashad, a
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civilian.47 Military-police rivalry, so often reported in Maluku, Poso, Kalimantan, 
Aceh, and other places, may spread to the world of intelligence very soon.
47 See Suara Pembaruan, January 2, 2001 for the reorganization of the Defense Department; and Suara 
Pembaruan, December 29,2000 for the reorganization of Bakin into BIN. The police intelligence staff were 
withdrawn from BIA when the police were separated from the military.
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Cut-off Date: January 31, 2001 
Office
Officeholder
Date and Place of Birth. Ethnic Origin 
Graduating Class 
Divisional or Service Background 
Date of Installation 
Officeholder's previous post
Armed Forces* Headquarters
Commander of the Armed Forces (Panglima TNI)
- Gen. Wiranto
b. 7 vii 1947, in Yogyakarta. Javanese
AMN 1968
Infantry
20 ii 98 - 5 xi 99 (20.5 months)
Army Chief of Staff
- Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
b. Aug. 1,1944, Boyolali. Javanese
Navy Academy 1968
Navy
5 xi 99 - (15 months)
Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces
Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces (Wakil 
Panglima TNI)
- Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
b. Aug. 1,1944, Boyolali. Javanese
Navy Academy 1968
Navy
17 vii 99 - c. 5 xi 99 (10.5 months)
Navy Chief of Staff
- Gen. Fachrul Razie
b. July 26,1947, Banda Aceh. Acehnese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - 20 ix 2000 (10.5 months)
Secretary General, Department of Defense and 
Security
The post was abolished on September 20,2000.
Chief of the General Staff (Kasum TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Fachrul Razie
b. June 26,1947, Banda Aceh. Acehnese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
20 iii 98 - c. 4 i 99 (9.5 months)
Assistant for Operations to Armed Forces' 
Chief of General Staff
- Lt. Gen. Sugiono
b. Sept. 10,1948, Cilacap. Javanese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 - 3 xii 99 (11 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy
b. Jan. 5,1947, Haruku, Maluku. Ambonese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
3 xii 9 9 - 8  iii 2000 (3 months)
Commander, Kodam VII Wirabuana
- Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. April 8,1949, Palembang. Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
8 iii 2000 - (11 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Chief of Territorial Affairs (Raster TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
b. Sept. 9,1949, Pacitan. Javanese 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
9 xi 98 - 9 xi 99 (12 months)
Armed Forces’ Chief of the Social and Political 
Staff
- Lt. Gen. Agus Widjaya
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
9 xi 99 - (15 months)
Commander, Armed Forces' Staff and 
Command School
Inspector-General (Irjen TNI)
- Air Vice-Marshal Tamtama Ali
Air Force
c. 2 x 98 - 14 vi 2000 (20.5 months)
Assistant for Planning to Air Force Chief of 
Staff
- Vice-Admiral Djaelani
Navy
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Inspector-General of the Navy
Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to 
Commander of the Armed Forces
- Maj. Gen. Agus Widjaja
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
12 i 98 - c 4 i 99 (12 months)
Expert Staff on Security and Defense to 
Commander of the Armed Forces
- Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
b. Oct. 17,1951, Bandung. Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
4 i 99 - 3 xii 99 (11 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command School
- Maj. Gen. Purwadi
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Cavalry
3 xii 99 - (14 months)
Commander, Kodam HI Siliwangi
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Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) to Chief of 
General Staff
- Rear Admiral Yoost Frederieck Mengko
Navy
? (by 19 vii 99) -
Expert Staff Coordinator to Navy Chief of 
Staff
Assistant for Operations (Asops) to Chief of 
General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. April 29,1947, Purworejo. Javanese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 2 x 98 - c. 5 xi 99 (13 months)
Commander, Presidential Security Guard
- Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri
b. Nov. 20,1949, Bandung. Sundanese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - (15 months)
Commander, Kodam IX Udayana
Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to Chief 
of Territorial Affairs
- Maj. Gen. Djoko Mulono
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
c. 2 x 98 - (28 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army 
Chief of Staff
Assistant for Personnel (Aspers) to Chief of 
General Staff
- Maj. Gen. Soeparto S.
b. Sept. 7,1944, Kudus. Javanese 
AMN 1966
Infantry 
14 viii 97 - ?
Head, General Affairs, Coordinating Body for 
National Stability
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog) to Chief of General 
Staff
- Maj. Gen. Makmun Basri
AMN 1968 
Infantry
14 viii 97 - c. 5 xi 99 (26.5 months)
Head, Armed Forces' Supply Body (Babek 
ABRI)
- Maj. Gen. Tabrie
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - (15 months)
Head, Armed Forces' Supply Body (Babek 
TNI)
Assistant for Social Communications (Askomsos) 
to Chief of Territorial Affairs
- Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi
b. July 13,1949, Pematang Siantar. Toba 
Batak
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
c. 6 x 98 - c. 5 xi 99 (13 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
- Maj. Gen. Jahja Satyawiria
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - (15 months)
Expert Staff for Domestic Politics to Minister 
of Defense and Security
Head, BIA (Armed Forces' Intelligence Body) /Bais 
TNI (Military Strategic Intelligence Body, 
reorganized on July 18,1999)
- Lt. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
b. Nov. 14,1948, Magelang. Javanese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 -12  i 2000 (12 months)
Commander, Kodam IV Diponegoro
- Air Vice-Marshall Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma
b. July 17,1948. Sundanese 
Air Force Academy 1970 
Air Force
12 i 2000 - (12.5 months)
Commander, Air Force 2nd Operational 
Command
Central Executive Organs
Commander-General, Military Academy (Danjen 
Akmil)
- Vice-Admiral Abu Hanifah Hasanudin
Navy
c. 29 vi 98 - 15 v 99 (10.5 months)
Governor, Navy Academy
- Vice-Admiral Bambang Surjanto
Javanese
Navy Academy 1968 
Navy
15 v 99 - c. 14 vi 2000 (13 months)
Assistant for Personnel to Navy Chief of Staff
- Air Vice Marshall Chappy Hakim
Air Force
c. 14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Assistant for Personnel to Air Force Chief of 
Staff
Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff and 
Command School (Sesko TNI)
- Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang
b. July 28,1947, Manado. Menadonese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
21 viii 98 -1 6  i 99 (5 months)
Chief of the Armed Forces' General Staff
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- Lt. Gen. Agus Widjaja
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
16 i 99 - c. 5 xi 99 (8.5 months)
Assistant for General Planning to Commander 
of the Armed Forces
- Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. April 29,1947, Purworejo. Javanese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 -1  iii 2000 (4 months)
Assistant for Operations to Chief of General 
Staff
- Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman
b. Dec. 11,1949, Sukabumi. Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
I iii 2000 - (11 months)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center 
(Pusbintal)
- Brig. Gen. Mismar Anas
Akmil 1971
18 ii 98 - (36.5 months)
Head, Research and Development Center 
(Puslitbang)
- Brig. Gen. A. Harsono
Javanese 
Akmil ?
Infantry
I I  iv 97 - ?
Deputy Head, Research and Development 
Center
Head, Armed Forces' Center for History and 
Tradition (Pusjarah)
- Brig. Gen. Sumarno
b. 1944, Solo. Javanese 
Akmil ?
Infantry
12 vi 98 - c. 23 x 99 (16.5 months)
- Brig. Gen. Sjaiful Islam
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
c. 23 x 99 - (15 months)
Director for Mobilization and 
Demobilization, Department of Defense and 
Security
Head, Armed Forces’ Medical Center (Puskes)
- Rear-Admiral Dr. Harijanto Mahdi
Javanese
Navy Medical Corps
31 x 96 - c. 1 xi 2000 (48 months)
Director, Navy Medical Center
- Brig. Gen. Dr. Krismanto Prawirosumarto
Javanese
Army Medical Corps.
c. 1 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Head, Gatot Subroto Hospital
Head, Armed Forces’ Police Center (Puspom)
- Maj. Gen. Djasri Marin
b. Sept. 30,1948, Payakumbuh. Minangkabau
Akmil 1973
Military Police
19 x 98 - (27.5 months)
Deputy Head, Armed Forces' Police Center
Head, Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen)
- Maj. Gen. Sjamsul Ma'arif
b. Sept. 27,1998, Kediri. Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
18 vi 98 - 24 viii 99 (14.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam V Brawijaya
- Maj. Gen. Sudradjat
Sundanese 
Akmil 1971 
Artillery?
24 viii 99 -1 3  i 2000 (4.5 months)
Deputy Head, Armed Forces’ Information 
Center
- Air Vice Marshall Dian Graito Usodo
b. Feb. 7,1944, Temanggung. Javanese 
Air Force Academy 1968
Air Force
13 i 2000 - (12.5 months)
Expert Staff to Commander of the Armed 
Forces
Head, Armed Forces' Legal Upbuilding Body 
(Babinkum)
- Maj. Gen. Timor P. Manurung
Toba Batak?
Akmil 1971
Judge-Advocate Corps
15 vi 98 - (31.5 months)
Armed Forces's Judge Advocate General
Head, Armed Forces’ Supply Body (Babek)
- Brig. Gen. Tabrie
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
13 viii 97 - c. 5 xi 99 (26.5 months)
Officer seconded to Army General Logistics 
Staff
- Brig. Gen. Supandi Herman
Sundanese 
Akmil ?
c. 5 xi 99 - (15 months)
Commander, Western Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Mudjito
b. 1945, Tulungagung. Javanese
Navy Academy 1970
Navy
23 iii 97 - 2 ix 99 (29 months)
Chief of Staff, Eastern Fleet
160 The Editors
- Rear-Admiral Indroko Sastrowirjono
b. Karanganyar. Javanese 
Navy Academy 1971 
Navy
2 ix 99 - 6 vii 2000 (10 months)
Chief of Staff, Western Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Si Putu Ardana
Balinese
Navy
6 vii 2000 - (7 months)
Assistant for Planning to Navy Chief of Staff
Commander, Eastern Fleet
- Rear-Admiral Edi Sujadi
b. Nov. 4,1947, Madiun. Javanese
Navy Academy 1969
Navy
2 viii 97 - 31 viii 99 (25 months)
Director for Operations and Training, Navy
- Rear-Admiral Adi Haryono
b. July 13,1946, Kediri. Javanese 
Navy
31 viii 99 - (17 months)
Deputy Commander, Armed Forces' Staff and 
Command School
Head, National Air Defense Command 
(Kohanudnas)
- First Air Marshal Moch. Koesbeni
b. Magetan. Javanese 
Air Force Academy 1969 
14 viii 97 - (41.5 months)
Director for Planning and Personnel 
Management, Air Force
Service Heads and Army Hierarchy
Army Chief of Staff
- Gen. Subagyo Hadi Siswoyo
b. June 12,1946, Bantul, Yogyakarta. Javanese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry (RPKAD/Kopassus)
23 ii 98 - 2 xii 99 (21 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
b. Nov. 14,1948, Magelang. Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
2 xii 99 - 9 x 2000 (10 months)
Head, Military Strategic Intelligence Body
- Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. April 29,1947, Purworejo. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
9 x 2000 - (4 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Navy Chief of Staff
- Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
b. Aug. 1,1944, Boyolali. Javanese
Navy Academy 1968 
Navy
29 vi 98 - 23 vii 99 (13 months)
Deputy Navy Chief of Staff
- Admiral Achmad Sutjipto
b. May 12,1945, Bondowoso. Javanese
Navy Academy 1969
Navy
23 vii 99 - 9 x 2000 (14 months)
Deputy Navy Chief of Staff
- Admiral Indroko Sastrowiryo
b. April 10,1947, Karanganyar. Javanese
Navy Academy 1971
Navy
9 x 2000 - (4 months)
Deputy Navy Chief of Staff
Air Force Chief of Staff
- Air Marshall Hanafie Asnan
b. Nov. 7,1945, Bangkalan. Madurese 
Air Force Academy 1969 
Air Force
29 vi 98 - (31 months)
Assistant for Logistics to Air Force Chief of 
Staff
Commander of Marine Corps
- Maj. Gen. Suharto
b. Dec. 2,1947, Jakarta. Javanese 
Navy Academy 1969 
Marines
1 ii 96 - 8 xii 99 (46 months)
Deputy Governor, Navy Academy
- Maj. Gen. Hari Triyono
b. Dec. 22,1947, Cepu. Javanese 
Navy Academy 1971 
Marines
8 xii 99 - (14 months)
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
- Lt. Gen. Soegiono
b. Sept. 10,1948, Cilacap. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
17 iii 98 - 18 i 99 (10 months)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
- Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang
b. July 28,1947, Manado. Menadonese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
18 i 99 - 9 xi 99 (8.5 months)
Commander, Armed Forces’ Staff and 
Command School
- Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. March 8,1949, Palembang. Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
9 xi 99 - 1 iii 2000 (4 months)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve-
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- Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. April 29,1947, Purworejo. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
1 iii 2000 - 24 xi 2000 (9 months) 
Commander, Armed Forces' Staff and 
Command School
- Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri
b. 1947, Karawang. Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
24 xi 2000 - (2 months)
Commander, Kodam IX Udayana
Army Inspector-General
- Maj. Gen. Nurdin Jusuf
b. Mar. 7,1944, Banda Aceh. Acehnese 
AMN 1968
Infantry (RPKAD/Kopassus)
5 viii 97 - c. 4 i 99 (17 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
b. Jan. 19,1947, Kediri. Madurese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 - (25 months)
Commander, Kodam V Brawijaya
Assistant for Security (Aspam)
- Maj. Gen. M. Noor Aman
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
1 vi 98 - 30 vi 2000 (25 months) 
Commander, Army Intelligence Center
- Maj. Gen. I Dewa Putu Rai
Balinese
Akmil 1971
Signal Corps
30 vi 2000 - (7 months)
Head, Army Information Service
Assistant for Operations (Asops)
- Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri1
b. 1947, Karawang, Sundanese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 14 v 98 - c. 5 xi 99 (17.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army 
Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring
b. Aug. 3,1947, Pancur Batu, N. Sumatra. 
Karo Batak
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - 30 vi 2000 (8 months) 
Commander, Kodam VIII Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Sjahrir M.S.
b. July 20,1947, Baturaja. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry (Kopassus)
30 vi 2000 - (7 months)
Commander, Special Forces
Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)
- Maj. Gen. Sukardjo
Javanese 
AMN 1968 
Infantry
5 viii 97 - c. 1 iii 2000 (31 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to Army Chief 
of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Suprapto
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
c. 1 iii 2000 - (11 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army 
Chief of Staff
Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)
- Maj. Gen. Wahidin Yusuf
AMN 1968 
Infantry
5 viii 97 - 10 ix 99 (25 months)
Deputy Assistant for Logistics to Army Chief 
of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Irvan Edison
b. Aug. 13,1946, Morotai. Morotai 
Akmil 1970
Cavalry
10 ix 99 - (17 months)
Governor, Military Academy
Assistant for Planning and Budget (Asrena)
- Maj. Gen. Sugiarto Maksum
Javanese
c. 17 iii 98 - (34.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Planning and Budget to 
Army Chief of Staff
Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)
- Maj. Gen. Suprapto
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
c. 2 x 98 - c. 1 iii 2000 (17 months)
Deputy Assistant for Functional Affairs to 
Armed Forces' Chief of the Social and 
Political Staff
- Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi
b. Jan. 18,1951, Brebes. Javanese 
Akmil 1973
Signal Corps
c. 1 iii 2000 - 30 vi 2000 (4 months)
Officer seconded to Armed Forces' 
Headquarters
- Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
Balinese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry (Kopassus)
30 vi 2000 - (7 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
162 The Editors
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
- Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. April 8,1949, Padang. Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
23 v 98 - 24 xi 99 (18 months)
Commander, Kodam HI Siliwangi
- Lt. Gen. Djaja Suparman
b. Dec. 11,1949, Sukabumi. Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
24 xi 99 - 29 iii 2000 (4 months)
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
b. Oct. 17,1951, Bandung. Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
29 iii 2000 - 1 viii 2000 (4 months) 
Commander, Kodam VII Wirabuana
- Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21,1950, Palembang. Palembangese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
1 viii 2000 - (6 months)
Commander, Kodam Jaya
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
- Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21,1950, Palembang. Palembangese 
Akmil 1974
Infantry (continued next column)
9 vii 98 - c. 4 i 99 (6 months)
Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. May 10,1949. Balinese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry (Kopassus)
c. 4 i 99 - 14 vi 2000 (17.5 months) 
Commander, Kodam VI Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa
b. April 13,1949, Kupang. West Timorese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - c. 6 xi 2000 (4.5 months) 
Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Songko Pumomo
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
c. 6 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve
- Maj. Gen. I. Gede Purnawa
Balinese 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
23 vi 98 -1 4  vii 2000 (24.5 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and Command 
School
- Maj. Gen. Harry Kosasih
Sundanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
14 vii 2000 - (6.5 months)
Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Army Strategic 
Reserve
- Maj. Gen. William T. Da Costa
b. April 13,1949, Kupang. West Timorese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
28 vii 98 - 14 vi 2000 (22.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IX Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Songko Pumomo
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - 2 xii 2000 (5.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951, Samosir, N. Sumatra. Toba Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
2 xii 2000 -1 9  i 2001 (2 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IX Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Achmad Djunaedi Sikki
b. Aug. 27,1950, Bone, S. Sulawesi. Buginese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
26 i 2001 -
Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
Governor, General and Army Division, Military 
Academy (Akmil)
- Maj. Gen. Irvan Edison
b. Aug. 13,1946, Morotai. Morotai
Akmil 1970
Cavalry
9 vii 98 - 30 viii 99 (14 months)
Deputy Governor, Military Academy
- Maj. Gen. Sjamsul Ma'arif
b. Sept. 27,1950, Kediri. Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
30 viii 9 9 - 1 1  vii 2000 (10.5 months)
Head, Armed Forces' Information Center
- Maj. Gen. M. Noor Aman
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
11 vii 2000 - (6.5 months)
Assistant for Security to Army Chief of Staff
Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite 163
Commander, Army Staff and Command School 
(Seskoad)
- Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
b. Oct. 17,1951, Bandung. Sundanese 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
7 x 98 - c. 4 i 99 (3 months)
Expert Staff for Politics and Security to 
Commander of the Armed Forces
- Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Engineers
c. 4 i 99 - 5 vii 2000 (18 months)
Deputy Assistant for Logistics to Army Chief 
of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Bibit Walujo
b. Aug. 5,1949, Klaten. Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
5 vii 2000 - 28 i 2001 (7 months)
Commander, Kodam IV Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Suadi Atma
b. June 22,1947, Banjarmasin. Banjarese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry 
28 i 2001 -
Officer seconded to Ministry of Defense and 
Security
Commander, Education and Training Command 
(Kodiklat)
- Maj. Gen. Sumardi
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
2 xi 98 - 5 vii 2000 (20 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center
- Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring
b. Aug. 3,1947, Pancur Batu, N. Sumatra,
Karo Batak 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
5 vii 2000 - (7 months)
Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of 
Staff
2
Commander, Infantry Weapons Center (Pussenif)
- Maj. Gen. Sutardjo
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
2 xi 98 - c. 5 xi 99 (12 months)
Deputy Commander, Infantry Weapons Center
- Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Gaffar
b. March 20,1949, Pamekasan. Madurese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 -14  vi 2000 (7.5 months) 
Commander, Kodam I Bukit Barisan
- Maj. Gen. Ismed Juzairi
b. Jan. 1,1949, Sawahlunto. Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Commander, Army Territorial Center
Commander, Army Territorial Center
- Maj. Gen. Thomas A. Umboh
Menadonese?
AMN 1968 
Infantry
14 viii 97 - c. 4 i 99 (16.5 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Territorial Center
- Maj. Gen. Ismed Juzairi
b. Jan. 1,1949, Sawahlunto. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1971
c. 4 i 99 -1 4  vi 2000 (17.5 months) 
Commander, Kodam I Bukit Barisan
- Maj. Gen. Max Markus Tamaela
Ambonese 
Akmil 1970 
Engineers
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Commander, Kodam XVI Pattimura
- Maj. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry 
c. ii - 2001 -
Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army 
Chief of Staff
Commander, Special Forces Command (Kopassus)
- Maj. Gen. Syahrir M.S.
b. July 20,1947, Baturaja. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry (Kopassus)
25 v 98 -1 4  vi 2000 (12.5 months) 
Commander, Kodam IX Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni
b. March 29,1952, Malang. Madurese 
Akmil 1975
Infantry (Kopassus)
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Security to Army Chief 
of Staff
Commander, Presidential Security Guard 
(Paspampres)
- Maj. Gen. Suwandi
Javanese 
Akmil ?
c. 2 x 98 - 28 iii 2000 (18 months)
Deputy Commander, Presidential Security 
Guard
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- Maj. Gen. I Putu Wingarta Sastra
b. Dec. 29,1951, Denpasar. Balinese 
Akmil 1974
Cavalry
28 iii 2000 - c. 6 xi 2000 (7 months) 
Commander, Intelligence Task Force, Military 
Strategic Intelligence Body
- Maj. Gen. Amir Tohar
Akmil 1974 
Signals Corps
c. 6 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Commander, Intelligence Task Force, Military 
Strategic Intelligence Body
Regional M ilitary Commanders
Kodam (Military Region Command) I/Bukit 
Barisan (Northern Sumatra)
Commander, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan
- Maj. Gen. Ismed Juzairi
b. Jan. 1,1949, Sawahlunto. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry (Kostrad)
21 iv 98 - c. 4 i 99 (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Gaffar
b. March 20,1949, Pamekasan. Madurese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 - 18 xii 99 (11.5 months)
Senior officer seconded to Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Affandi
b. April 16,1947, Magetan. Javanese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry
18 xii 99 -1 8  vii 2000 (7 months) 
Commander, Kodam II Sriwijaya
- Maj. Gen. I Gede Purnawa
Balinese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
18 vii 2000 - (6.5 months)
Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
Chief of Staff, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan
- Brig. Gen. Djibud Hindartono
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
c. 13 viii 97 - ?
Commander, Korem 023 Sibolga
- Brig. Gen. A.E.H. Rajagukguk
Toba Batak 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry 
? - c. 5 xi 99
- Brig. Gen. Asril Hamzah Tandjung
Mandailing Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - (15 Months)
Education, National Defense Institute
Korem (Military Resort Commands) under Kodam 
I/Bukit Barisan
Korem 011 Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe)
- Col. Drs. H. Djoni A. Wahab
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
4 xi 98 - 16 vi 99 (7.5 months)
Assistant for Logistics, Kodam IX Udayana
- Col. Sjafnil Armen
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
16 vi 99 - c, 26 ix 2000 (15.5 months)
Head, Army Intelligence Education and 
Training Center
- Col. Mohamad Jahja
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam I Bukit 
Barisan
Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh)
- Col. Asril Hamzah Tandjung S.
Mandailing Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
29 iv 98 - 8 v 99 (12 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam IV 
Diponegoro
- Col. Sjarifuddin Tippe
b. June 7,1953, Sinjai, S. Sulawesi. Buginese 
Akmil 1975 
Engineers 
8 v 99 - (21 months)
Commander, Army Engineers Education 
Center
Korem 022 Pantai Timur (Pematang Siantar)
- Col. Drs. H. Machfud H.W.
Akmil?
Infantry
? vi 97 - ? (by 2 vi 2000)
- Col. Bambang Slamet Ismojo
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Cavalry
? (by 2 vi 2000) -
Korem 023 Pantai Barat (Sibolga)
- Col. Liliek A.S. Sumarjo
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? - c. 26 ix 2000
Assistant for Intelligence, Army Strategic 
Reserve
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- Col. Adrianus Taroreh
b. Aug. 1,1951, Tomohon. Menadonese 
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Education Center
Korem 031 Wirabima (Pekanbaru)
- Col. Mohammad Gadillah
b. Palembang 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
9 v 98 - 3 v 99 (12 months)
Lecturer, Army Staff and Command School
- Col. Mazni Harun
b. July 13,1949, Agam. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1974
Artillery
3 v 99 - (21 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam Jaya
Korem 032 Wirabraja (Padang)
- Col. Dahler Syaiful Hasibuan
Toba Batak?
Akmil 1974
Infantry (continued next column)
6 xi 98 - c. 26 ix 2000 (23 months)
Assistant for Logistics, Kodam VII 
Wirabuana
- Col. Soeprijanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)
Director for Functional Development, Army 
Intelligence Center
Kodam II/Sriwijaya (Southern Sumatra) 
Commander Kodam II/Sriwijaya
- Maj. Gen. Affandi
b. April 16,1947, Magetan. Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
12 x 98 - 18 xi 99 (13 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command School
- Maj. Gen. Sutarjo
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
18 xi 99 - (14.5 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center
Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya
- Brig. Gen. M. Ansjori Deas
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
21 iv 98 - 14 vi 2000 (25.5 months) 
Commander, Korem 044 Palembang
- Brig. Gen. Sjamsul Mappareppa
Buginese 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Chief of Staff, 1st Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
Korem 041 Garuda Mas (Bengkulu)
- Col. Sjahrial B.P. Peliung
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
7 vi 97 -15  vi 99 (24.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam II Sriwijaya
- Col. Sjarifudin Sumah
b. March 16, 1950, Manado. Gorontalonese?
Akmil 1973
Infantry
15 vi 99 - 8 xi 2000 (16.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam V 
Brawijaya
- Col. Wilono Djatiwijono
Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
8 xi 2000 - (4 months)
Commander, Army Intelligence Education 
Center
Korem 042 Garuda Putih (Jambi)
- Col. Soepriadi S.E.
b. Dec. 19,1951, Ciamis. Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Cavalry
16 ix 97 - 10 v 99 (20 months)
Assistant for Personnel, Kodam II Bukit 
Barisan
- Col. Muhammad Sochib
b. Jan. 1,1954, Kudus. Javanese
Akmil 1975
Artillery
10 v 99 -11  viii 2000 (15 months)
- post held temporarily by Col. Bambang 
Sukrisno (11 viii 2000 - 30 x 2000)
- Col. Juktayana Tjitra Witjaksana
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
30 x 2000 - (4 months)
Coordinating Officer, Expert Staff, Army 
Information Service
Korem 043 Garuda Hitam (Lampung)
- Col. Comelis Simbolon
b. July 14,1951, Pangurunan, N. Tapanuli. 
Toba Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
12 ix 97 - 22 v 99 (16.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam I Bukit 
Barisan
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- Col. Mudjiono
b. April 10,1951, Yogyakarta. Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
22 v 99 - (20 months)
Deputy Commander, Korem 164 Dili
Korem 044 Garuda Dempo (Palembang)
- Col. Sunarso
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Artillery
30 v 98 - ? v 2000 (24 months)
Assistant for Personnel, Kodam V Brawijaya
- Col. Djoko Susilo Utomo
b. Nov. 9,1952, Bandung. Javanese 
Akmil 1975?
Infantry
? v 2000 - (8 months)
Commander, Army Intelligence Education 
Center
Kodam IH/Siliwangi (West Java)
Commander, Kodam HI/Siliwangi
- Maj. Gen. Purwadi
b. July 20,1949, Bojonegoro. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Cavalry
25 v 98 - 23 xi 99 (18 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam III Siliwangi
- Maj. Gen. Slamet Supriyadi
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
23 xi 99 -1 3  vii 2000 (7.5 months)
Senior Staff for Defense and Security, 
National Defense Institute
- Maj. Gen. Zainuri Hasyim
b. July 22,1946, Malang. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
13 vii 2000 - (6.5 months)
Commander, Kodam VI Tanjungpura
Chief of Staff Kodam III/Siliwangi
- Brig. Gen. Darsono
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
3 vi 98 - (32 months)
Commander, Korem 064 Serang
Korem 061 Suriakencana (Bogor)
- Col. Suprapto
Javanese
Akmil?
Infantry
29 v 98 - 6 v 2000 (21 months)
Commander, Education Center, Army Infantry 
Weapons Center
- Col. Darlan
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
6 v 2000 -11 xi 2000 (6 months; died)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam II Sriwijaya
- Col. Mulyono
Akmil 1974 
Infantry 
16 i 2001 -
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam HI 
Siliwangi
Korem 062 Tarumanegara (Garut)
- Col. Atori Herdianadjaja
Sundanese 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
15 vii 98 - c. 26 ix 2000 (25.5 months) 
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam ID 
Siliwangi
- Col. Burhanurdin Amin
Akmil 1976 
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Army Strategic 
Reserve
Korem 063 Sunan Gunung Jati (Cirebon)
- Col. Herry Tjahyana
b. Malang. Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 98 - c. 15 iv 2000
- Col. Mochamad Irianto
b. Jan. 31,1951, Sumenep. Madurese 
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 15 iv 2000 -
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam Jaya
Korem 064 Maulana Yusuf (Serang)
- Col. Bambang Sugito
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
3 vi 98 - c. 26 ix 2000 (26 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam III Siliwangi
- Col. Bambang Sukresna
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)
Assistant for Planning, Kodam II Sriwijaya
Kodam IV/Diponegoro (Central Java) 
Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Tyasno Sudarno
b. Nov. 14,1948, Magelang. Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
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13 iv 98 - 15 i 99 (9 months)
Assistant for Planning and Budget to Army 
Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Bibit Walujo
b. Aug. 3,1949, Klaten. Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
15 i 99 -1 0  vii 2000 (18 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV Diponegoro
- Maj. Gen. Sumarsono
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
10 vii 2000 - (7.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Personnel to Army Chief 
of Staff
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro
- Brig. Gen. Bibit Walujo
b. Aug. 3,1949, Klaten. Javanese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 12 ix 97 - c. 4 i 99 (15.5 months) 
Commander, Korem 043 Lampung
- Brig. Gen. Songko Pumomo
Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 - 14 vi 2000 (15.5 months)
Middle ranking officer seconded to Army 
Headquarters
- Brig. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8,1952, Solo. Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Social Communications 
to Chief of Territorial Affairs
Korem 071 Wijayakusuma (Purwokerto)
- Col. M. Noer Muis
b. 1953, Kuala Simpang, Aceh. Acehnese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
16 vii 98 -1 9  vi 99 (11 months)
Personal Secretary to Commander of the 
Armed Forces (Gen. Feisal Tanjung)
- Col. Haryadi Soetanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
19 vi 99 - 27 x 2000 (16.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam VII 
Wirabuana
- Col. Supiadin Yusuf A.S.
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
27 x 2000 - (4 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam IV 
Diponegoro
Korem 072 Pamungkas (Yogyakarta)
- Col. Ridwan Sulandjana
b. March 1,1951, Bogor. Sundanese 
Akmil 1974
Infantry
2 xi 98 - 3 i 2000 (14 months)
- Col. Bambang Suherman
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
3 i 2000 - (13 months)
Korem 073 Makutarama (Salatiga)
- Col. Arri Sujono
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
28 ix 96 - c. v 99 (35 months)
Assistant for Personnel, Kodam IV 
Diponegoro
- Col. Sjaiful Rizal
Akmil 1975 
Infantry (Kopassus)
c. v 99 - 27 viii 2000 (12 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam VI 
Tanjungpura
- Col. Adji Wijono
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
27 viii 2000 - (5 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam IV 
Diponegoro
Korem 074 Warastratama (Solo)
- Col. Srijanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
5 ix 97 -1 0  v 99 (20.5 months)
Officer seconded to Functional Affairs, Armed 
Forces' Headquarters
- Col. Heru Sudibyo
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
10 v 99 - 21 i 2000 (8 months)
Officer Seconded to Social and Political Staff, 
Armed Forces' Headquarters
- Col. Karsadi
b. March 17,1952, Pemalang. Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
21 i 2000 - (12 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam IV 
Diponegoro
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Kodam V/Brawijaya (East Java)
Commander, Kodam V/Brawijaya
- Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
b. Jan. 19,1947, Kediri. Madurese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
9 vii 98 -1 4  i 99 (6.5 months)
Governor, Military Academy
- Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21,1950, Palembang. Palembangese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
14 i 99 -1 6  xi 99 (10 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi
b. July 13,1949, Pematang Siantar. Toba
Batak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
16 xi 99 - (14.5 months)
Assistant for Social-Political Affairs to Chief 
of Social-Political Staff
Chief of Staff, Kodam V/Brawijaya
- Brig. Gen. Sudibyo Tjiptonegoro
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Artillery
29 vi 98 -1 4  vi 2000 (23.5 months)
Senior Expert Staff on Culture and Sport to 
Army Chief of Staff
- Brig. Gen. Djoko Setiono
b. Tulungagung. Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Presidential Adjutant (Abdurrahman Wahid)
Korem 081 Dhirot Saha Jaya (Madiun)
- Col. Suhartono
Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
8 x 97 - 4 iv 99 (19 months)
Personal Secretary to Army Chief of Staff 
(Gen. R. Hartono)
- Col. Bambang Suranto
b. Oct. 6,1952. Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
4 iv 99 - c. 11 ii 2000 (10.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Army Strategic 
Reserve
- Col. Mochamad Ibnu Hadjar
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 11 ii 2000 - (11.5 months)
Korem 082 Citra Panca Yudha Jaya (Mojokerto)
- Col. Sambas Atmawijaya
Sundanese?
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
c. 2 ii 98 - c. 26 x 2000 (33 months) 
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs, 
Kodam III Siliwangi
- Col. Tris Suryawan Adiwijaya
b. W. Java. Sundanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 26 x 2000 - (3 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam V 
Briwijaya
Korem 083 Baladhika Jaya (Malang)
- Col. Agus Suyitno
b. March 23,1951, Bojonegoro. Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
6 ii 98 - 30 iv 99 (15 months)
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs, 
Kodam V Brawijaya
- Col. Suryjo Gino
Javanese 
Akmil 1976 
Infantry
30 iv 99 - (9 months)
Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya)
- Col. Bambang Satriawan
b. Mar. 3,1949, Sragen, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Artillery
22 ix 97 -11  ii 2000 (28.5 months)
Head, Department of Territorial Affairs, 
Army Staff and Command School
- Col. Bambang Suranto
b. Oct. 6,1952. Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
11 ii 2000 - (11.5 months)
Commander, Korem 081 Madiun
Kodam VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan) 
Commander, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura
- Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. Mar. 10,1949. Balinese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry (Kopassus)
24 iii 98 -1 2  i 99 (9.5 months)
Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Zainuri Hasjim
b. July 27,1946, Malang. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Artillery
12 i 99 -1 4  vi 2000 (17 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI Tanjungpura
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- Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman
Javanese 
Akmil 1970 
Engineers
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command School
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura
- Brig. Gen. Zainuri Hasjim
b. July 27,1946, Malang. Javanese 
Akmil 1971
Artillery
c. 1 ix 97 -11 i 99 (16.5 months)
Officer Seconded to Armed Forces' 
Headquarters
- Brig. Gen. Yudo Wibowo
b. Dec. 15,1953, Bojonegoro. Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
11 i 99 -1 4  vi 2000 (17 months)
Officer Seconded to Armed Forces' 
Headquarters
- Brig. Gen. Azrai Kasim
b. Padang. Minangkabau 
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - (7.5 months)
Chief, Armed Forces' Center for Command and 
Guidance
Korem 091 Aji Suryanatakusuma (Balikpapan)
- Col. Rudy Budhiyanto Landung
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Artillery
18 vi 98 - c. 25 i 2000 (19.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam VI 
Tanjungpura
- Col. Tri Subagio
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 25 i 2000 - (12 months)
Korem 101 Antasari (Banjarmasin)
- Col. Bahir Alamsyah
b. Palembang 
Akmil 1974 
Cavalry
4 vii 98 - c. 12 iv 2000 (9.5 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam III Siliwangi
- Col. Efrizal Ramli
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 12 iv 2000 - (9.5 months)
Director for Development, Army Infantry 
Weapons Center
Korem 102 Panju Panjung (Palangka Raya)
- Col. Drs. Saut Lubis
b. N. Sumatra. Mandailing Batak
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
5 vi 98 - 25 i 2000 (20 months)
Commander, Student Corps, Army Staff and 
Command School
- Col. Sihono
b. Dec. 28,1950, Sukoharjo. Javanese
Akmil 1973
Engineers
25 i 2000 - (12 months)
Commander, Training Center for Military 
Teachers
Korem 121 Alambhana Wana Wai (Pontianak)
- Col. Encip Kadarusman
Sundanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
14 ix 98 -1 2  x 2000 (24.5 months)
Officer Seconded to Social Communications 
Staff, Armed Forces' Headquarters
- Col. Sumurung Simanjuntak
Toba Batak 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry
12 x 2000 - (3.5 months)
Assistant for Logistics, Kodam IV Diponegoro
Kodam VH/Wirabuana (Sulawesi)
Commander, Kodam Vll/Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy
b. Jan. 5,1947, Haruku, Maluku. Ambonese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
26 v 98 - 8 xii 99 (18 months)
Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of 
Staff
- Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusuma
b. Oct. 17,1951, Bandung. Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
8 xii 99 - 20 iii 2000 (3.5 months)
Assistant for General Planning to Commander 
of the Armed Forces
- Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro
b. March 18,1948, Kutoarjo. Javanese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry (RPKAD/Kopassus)
20 iii 2000 - 3 viii 2000 (4.5 months)
Expert Staff for People's Welfare to 
Commander of the Aimed Forces
- Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya
b. Oct. 11,1948, Bangkalan. Madurese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
3 viii 2000 - (6 months)
Expert Staff Coordinator to Army Chief of 
Staff
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Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/Wirabuana
- Brig. Gen. Ampi Nur Kamal Tanujiwa
Bantenese?
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
8 viii 97 - ? (by 21 vi 99)
Commander, Korem 064 Serang
- Brig. Gen. Mohamad Husni Thamrin Razak
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
? (by 21 vi 99) - c. 30 vii 2000
- Brig. Gen. Mustopo
Javanese 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry (Kopassus) 
c. 30 vii 2000 - (6 months)
Officer seconded to Army Logistics Staff
Korem 131 Santiago (Manado)
- Col. Richard Simorangkir
Toba Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
2 vii 98 - 13 vii 99 (12.5 months)
Officer seconded to Army Staff and Command 
School
- Col. Getson Manurung
Toba Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
13 vii 99 - c. 25 x 2000 (15.5 months) 
Commander, Chandradimuka Cadet Regiment, 
Military Academy
- Col. Manahan Rumahorbo
Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 25 x 2000 - (3 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam VII 
Wirabuana
Korem 132 Tadulako (Palu)
- Col. Djumara Frassad
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 14 xi 97 -1 0  iii 2000 (28 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam VII 
Wirabuana
- Col. Hamdan Z. Nasution
Mandailing Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
10 iii 2000 - (10.5 months)
Korem 141 Toddopuli (Watambone)
- Col. Salim Mengga
b. Polewali-Mamasa. Buginese?
Akmil 1974 
Cavalry
? (by xi 97) - 29 v 2000 (30 months)
Assistant for Social and Political Affairs, 
Kodam IV Diponegoro
- Col. Nasib Alamsyah
b. Jan. 19, 1950, Tarakan 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
29 v 2000 -
Officer seconded to Social Communications 
Staff, Armed Forces' Headquarters
Korem 142 Taroada Tarogaru (Pare Pare)
- Col. Darmawi Chaidir
Akmil 1974 
Infantry 
? (by 1997) - ?
- Col. Soeharnanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Engineers 
? (by 13 vi 2000) -
Korem 143 Haluoleo (Kendari)
- Col. J. Harry Pisand Pinem
Karo Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
9 x 97 - (by 23 i 2000) ?
Assistant for Intelligence, Special Forces
- Col. Makmursyah
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
? (by 22 vi 2000) -
Seconded to Army Territorial Center
Kodam VIII/Trikora (Irian Barat and 
Maluku)/Kodam XVII/Trikora 
Commander, Kodam VIII/XVII Trikora
- Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring
b. Aug. 3,1947, Pancur Batu, N. Sumatra. 
Karo Batak 
Akmil 1970 
Infantry
6 iv 98 - 4 xi 99 (19 months)
Director of Doctrine, Army Education and 
Training Command
- Maj. Gen. Albert Inkiriwang
b. Sept. 19,1949, Manado. Menadonese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
4 xi 99 - 13 xi 2000 (12 months)
Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs to 
Army Chief of Staff
- Maj. Gen. Tonny Anton Rompis
b. June 13,1948, Kaima, N. Sulawesi.
Menadonese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
13 xi 2000 - 8 i 2001 (3 months, died in plane 
crash)
Deputy Commander, Army Education and 
Training Command
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- Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951, Samosir. Toba Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
22 i 2001 -
Commander, 2nd Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII /XVII Trikora
- Brig. Gen. M. Idris Gassing
b. May 1951, Makassar. Makassarese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
4 vii 98 - 14 vi 2000 (23.5 months)
Deputy Commander-General, Special Forces
- Brig. Gen. Karel Albert Ralahalu
b. Tanjung Alang, Maluku. Ambonese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
14 vi 2000 - c. ? ii 2001(8 months)
Officer seconded to Army Territorial Staff
- Brig. Gen. Agus D.
Akmil ?
C. ? ii 2001 -
Officer seconded to Armed Forces' 
Headquarters
Korem 171 Praja Vira Tama (Sorong)
- Col. Karel Albert Ralahalu
b. Tanjung Alang, Maluku. Ambonese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
10 vi 97 -1 2  ii 99 (20 months)
Director, Army Territorial Center
- Col. T.H. Sinambela
Simalungun Batak 
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
12 ii 99 - c. 1 xi 2000 (20.5 months) 
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam VI 
Tanjungpura
- Col. Mangasa R. Saragih
Simalungun Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
c. 1 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam VIII Trikora
Korem 172 Praja Vira Yakthi (Abepura)
- Col. Joseph Samuel
Akmil 1971 
Infantry
30 v 97 - ? (by 23 xi 2000)
Assistant for Planning and Budget, Kodam 
VIII Trikora
- Col. S. K. Ginting Munthe
Karo Batak 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
? (by 1 x 2000) -
Korem 173 Praja Vira Braja (Biak)
- Col. F.X. Agus Edyono
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry 
? (by vii 98) -
Korem 174 Pattimura (Ambon)
- Col. Hikayat
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
31 v 97 -1 2  ii 99 (20.5 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam VIII Trikora
- Col. Karel A. Ralahalu
b. Tanjung Alang, Maluku. Ambonese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
12 ii 99 - 15 v 99 (15 months)
Commander, Korem 171 Manokwari 
Liquidated on May 15,1999 and replaced by 
Kodam XVI Pattimura
Kodam XVI/Pattimura (Ambon) [est. May 15, 
1999]
Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
- Brig. Gen. Max Marcus Tamaela
Ambonese 
Akmil 1970 
Engineers
15 v 99 - 26 vi 2000 (13.5 months)
Director for Facilities and Services, 
Department of Defense and Security
- Brig. Gen. I Made Yasa
Balinese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
26 vi 2000 - (7 months)
Officer seconded to Army Headquarters
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
- Col. Agus Suyitno
b. March 23,1951, Bojonegoro. Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
15 v 99 - c. 1 xi 2000 (17.5 months) 
Commander, Korem 083 Malang
- Col. Syarifuddin Sumah
b. Mar. 16,1950, Manado. Gorontalonese? 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Commander, Korem 041 Bengkulu
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Kodam IX/Udayana (Nusatenggara)
Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana
- Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri
b. Nov. 20,1949, Bandung. Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
16 vi 98 - 6 xii 99 (17.5 months)
Commander, 1st Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
- Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri
b. 1947, Karawang. Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
6 xii 99 - 16 xi 2000 (11 months)
Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of 
Staff
- Maj. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa
b. April 13,1949, Kupang. West Timorese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
16 xi 2000 - (2.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana
- Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951, Samosir. Toba Batak 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry (Kopassus)
25 vi 98 - c. 1 xi 2000 (28 months)
Chief of Staff, 2nd Infantry Division, Army 
Strategic Reserve
- Brig. Gen. Agus Suyitno
b. March 23,1951, Bojonegoro. Javanese 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI Pattimura
Korem 161 Wirasakti (Kupang)
- Col. Bambang Soemardji
Akmil 1972 
Infantry
c. 3 vi 97 -1 4  vi 99 (24.5 months)
Commander, Chandradimuka Cadet Regiment, 
Military Academy
- Col. Jurefar
Akmil 1974 
Artillery
14 vi 99 - 2 x 2000 (15.5 months)
Officer seconded to Organization Section, 
Operations Staff, Army Headquarters
- Col. Budi Heriyanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
2 x 2000 - (4 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam IX Udayana
Korem 162 Wirabhakti (Mataram)
- Col. Soekotjo Hadisoeprapto
Javanese
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
21 vi 97 - 31 x 2000 (40 months)
Deputy Commander, Korem 164 Dili
- Col. Suseno Yudoprawiro
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
31 x 2000 - (4 months)
Inspector of Personnel, Army Inspectorate- 
General
Korem 163 Worasatya (Denpasar)
- Col. I Made Yasa
Balinese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
10 x 97 - ? (by 9 viii 99)
Director for Physical Development, Army 
Infantry Weapons Center
- Col. Nurdin Zainal
b. May 4,1950, Bandung. Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
? (by 9 viii 99) - 1 xi 2000 
Military Attache, The Hague
- Col. Endang Suwarya
Sundanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
1 xi 2000 - (3 months)
Officer seconded to Operations Staff, Armed 
Forces' Headquarters
Korem 164 Wiradharma (Dili)
- Col. Suhartono Suratman
Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Infantry (Kopassus)
10 vi 98 - 13 viii 99 (14 months)
Commander, Group 3, Special Forces
- Col. Noer Muis
b. 1953, Kuala Simpang, East Aceh. Acehnese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
13 viii 99 - 15 ix 99 (1 month)
Commander, Combat Training Center 
(Baturaja, South Sumatra)
Kodam Jaya (Greater Jakarta)
Commander, Kodam Jaya
- Maj. Gen. Djaja Suparman
b. Dec. 11,1949, Sukabumi. Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
13 vii 98 - 19 xi 99 (16 months)
Commander, Kodam V Brawijaya
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- Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21,1950, Palembang. Palembangese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
19 xi 99 - 2 viii 2000 (8.5 months) 
Commander, Kodam V Brawijaya
- Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro
b. March 18,1948, Kutoarjo. Javanese 
Akmil 1970
Infantry (RPKAD/Kopassus)
2 viii 2000 - 22 i 2001 (6 months)
Commander, Kodam VII Wirabuana
- Maj. Gen. Bibit Walujo
b. Aug. 3,1949, Klaten. Javanese 
Akmil 1971 
Infantry 
22 i 2001 -
Commander, Army Staff and Command School
Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya
- Brig. Gen. Achmad Jahja
b. Oct. 11,1948, Bangkalan. Madurese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
6 x 98 - c. 1 iii 2000 (17 months)
Chief of Staff, Jakarta Capital Garrison
- Brig. Gen. Romulo Roberto Simbolon
b. 1951, Jakarta. Toba Batak 
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 iii 2000 - c. 30 vii 2000 (5 months)
Officer seconded to General Planning Staff, 
Armed Forces' Headquarters
- Brig. Gen. Lintang Walujo
b. Banyuwangi. Javanese 
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 30 vii 2000 - (6 months)
Officer seconded to Territorial Staff, Army 
Headquarters
4
Korem 051 Wijayakarta (Jakarta Timur)
- Col. George Toisutta
Ambonese?
Akmil 1976 
Infantry 
19 x 98 - ?
- Col. Prijanto
Javanese 
Akmil 1975 
Artillery 
? - 11 x 2000
Commander, 1st Air Defense Detachment, 
Kodam Jaya
- Col. R. Sutetyo
Javanese 
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
11 x 2000 - (3.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam Jaya
Korem 052 Wijayakrama (Jakarta Barat)1 2345
- Col. Tri Tamtomo
b. 1951. Javanese 
Akmil 1974 
Infantry
19 x 98 - c. 1 x 2000 (23 months) 
Assistant for Operations, Kodam Jaya
- Col. Koesnadi
Akmil 1973 
Infantry
c. 1 x 2000 - (4 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam II 
Sriwijaya
1 Commander, Emergency Military Authority, East 
Timor, Sept. 8,1999 - Sept. 23,1999.
2 The Army Infantry Weapons Center was 
integrated into the Army Education and Training 
Command (Kodiklat) on June 24,1999.
3 The Army Territorial Center was integrated into 
the Army Education and Training Command 
(Kodiklat) on June 24,1999.
4 Newly established on Oct. 19,1998 and 
responsible for the Military District Commands of 
East Jakarta, South Jakarta, and Bekasi.
5 Newly established on Oct. 19,1998 and 
responsible for the Military District Commands of 
North Jakarta, West Jakarta, and Tangerang. The 
Central Jakarta Military District Command comes 
directly under the commander of Kodam Jaya.

